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Abstract 
Ownership was usually a system implicitly assumed in the dynamics of company 
management, but it deserved more attention than a periodic control in the yearly general 
shareholder´s assembly. Empowerment of owners was required given the magnitude of 
decisions made in terms of capital and business purpose, and not just delegating it to the 
Board or the CEO. Despite the relevance of the topic, a gap was identified in the literature 
of corporate governance in family business from the ownership dimension. This 
longitudinal study used a quantitative approach with an explanatory scope that which 
sought to answer the question: Do shareholders corporate governance practices and family 
control influence financial performance on businesses? 104 public companies were 
analyzed and 36.5% of them were identified as family businesses, data were used from 
National Registry of Values and Issuers, which also responded the country Code 'survey of 
Colombia in the period 2008 to 2014. Data was processed with Student's t test and Random 
Effects analysis as a panel data technique. Results shown that family and non-family 
businesses had significant differences in ownership governance practices, but no 
significant relationship were identified between corporate governance practices of 
shareholders or family control with financial performance. The theoretical contribution to 
the areas of corporate governance and family business was to opening a new scenario for 
the study of ownership governance; the practical contribution was giving rise to the design 
of a model of practices for shareholders, where they develop a more active role in terms of 
capital and strategy decisions that exceeded the decision limits of the Board of Directors; 
Finally, a contribution in public policy was created by supporting the need to highlight 
corporate governance practices at the owners level, with models that differentiate Family 
Business and others. 
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Resumen 
La propiedad era generalmente un sistema implícito en la dinámica de la gestión de 
la empresa, pero merecía más atención que un control periódico en la asamblea general 
anual de accionistas. Se requería el empoderamiento de los propietarios dada la magnitud 
de las decisiones tomadas en términos de capital y propósito comercial, y no solo delegarlo 
en la Junta o el CEO. A pesar de la relevancia del tema, se identificó una brecha en la 
literatura de gobierno corporativo de la empresa familiar desde la dimensión de propiedad. 
Este estudio longitudinal utilizó un enfoque cuantitativo con un alcance explicativo que 
buscaba responder a la pregunta: ¿Las prácticas de gobierno corporativo de los accionistas 
y el control familiar influyen en el desempeño financiero de las empresas? Se analizaron 
104 empresas públicas y el 36,5% de ellas se identificaron como empresas familiares, se 
utilizaron datos del Registro Nacional de Valores y Emisores, que también respondió a la 
encuesta del Código de país de Colombia en el período 2008 a 2014. Los datos se 
procesaron con la prueba t de Student y análisis de efectos aleatorios como técnica de datos 
de panel. Los resultados mostraron que las empresas familiares y no familiares tenían 
diferencias significativas en las prácticas de gobierno de propiedad, pero no se 
identificaron relaciones significativas entre las prácticas de gobierno corporativo de los 
accionistas o el control familiar con el desempeño financiero. La contribución teórica a las 
áreas de gobierno corporativo y empresa familiar fue abrir un nuevo escenario para el 
estudio del gobierno de propiedad; la contribución práctica fue dar lugar al diseño de un 
modelo de prácticas para los accionistas, donde desarrollen un papel más activo en 
términos de decisiones de capital y estrategia que exceden los límites de decisión de la 
Junta de Directiva; Finalmente, se creó una contribución en las políticas públicas al apoyar 
la necesidad de resaltar las prácticas de gobierno corporativo a nivel de los propietarios, 
con modelos que diferencien a las empresas familiares y otras. 
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Introduction 
This doctoral thesis is made up of six parts: (a) the Abstract and Resumen 
Ejecutivo; (b) the Table of Contents; (c) the Research Proposal (RP), which was defended 
earlier; (d) the Results, made up of the accepted or published research paper presenting the 
doctoral research results; (e) the Conclusions and Recommendations; and (f) the 
Appendices. The abstract presents the research purpose, the research method, and the main 
finding in a maximum of 250 words: the new doctoral contribution to management science.  
The RP is the final version defended successfully by the student to become a 
doctoral candidate approximately one to two years earlier. This is why its references seem 
to be a bit old: they had a cut off in the year when the RP was defended. Besides the front 
page, Table of Contents, List of Tables, and List of Figures, it contains three chapters: (a) 
the Introduction, where the research problem is stated, defined, and formulated; (b) the 
Review of the Literature at the time of its defense. Here the student must show the 
knowledge gap that he/she found in the academic literature, which he/she addressed during 
his/her doctoral research; (c) the Methods used to carry out the research, where the student 
presented details about the population and sample used, the data collection and analyses, 
the research instrument(s) used, and most importantly, the validity and reliability of the 
research method, the research design, the research instrument(s), the statistical techniques 
and procedures used, and of his/her research findings. It also includes the list of References 
used in the RP and any Appendices attached to the RP at that time. 
Then, in Chapter IV the thesis includes a copy of the accepted or published 
research paper. This paper, as it should be, includes all the details that appear in the journal 
where it will be published o where it has been published: article title, author(s) name(s), 
abstract, keywords, paper contents, including the results, where the doctoral contribution to 
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the management science should be included. It also includes the Conclusions, and the list 
of References. 
The Appendices included in the thesis, among other files, include the following: (a) 
the letter of acceptance or a copy of the message accepting the research paper, (b) the 
presentation in PPT used to defend the RP, and (b) the presentation in PPT used in the 
thesis defense. 
In conclusion, this thesis is presented in a sui generis manner. The members of the 
Jury should therefore focus their attention in the Abstract, Chapter IV, where the research 
paper is presented, and in the Conclusions and Recommendations. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
Family businesses around the world are a large and important component of the 
economy, though often are associated with SMEs, they come to represent in many 
countries between 70% and 95% of all companies, which represent a similar contribution 
to the global GDP and between 50% and 80% of all jobs (European Family Businesses, 
2012). 
Their particular behavior has led many authors to study family businesses in order 
to identify what makes them different. Some studies indicate that one of the aspects that 
can influence the performance of these companies is the corporate governance applied by 
the owner family (Chrisman, Sharma, Steier, & Chua, 2013). 
A standard definition of corporate governance includes shareholders and refers to 
the defense of their interests (Tirole, 2001), in this way it addresses the problem of agency 
separation from ownership and control that affects all companies (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
According to Brenes, Madrigal, and Requena (2011) corporate governance can provide 
multiple benefits such as transparency, accountability and control, as well as having the 
potential to influence economic performance and generate positive impact on effective 
communication and family harmony. 
This study focuses on corporate governance practices at the ownership level, 
because the owners are the final decision-making body of enterprises through the general 
shareholder’s assembly. One of the reasons that led to this study is that property is always 
analyzed jointly with Board of Directors and Management, as if the owners themselves do 
not have the ability to influence companies. This study seeks to highlight the role of the 
ownership. 
In this chapter, a description of the background of this research is done, the 
research problem is established, as well as the purpose, significance and nature of the 
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study. Subsequently the central themes of research are defined: (a) Corporate governance, 
(b) Family and (c) Firm performance. At the end of the chapter assumptions, limitations 
and delimitations of the research are presented. 
Background of the Problem 
Over 30 years ago ownership system was incorporated into the study of family 
businesses (Davis & Tagiuri, 1982), but it has been virtually ignored by scholars of the 
area (Sharma, 2004), even though the ownership is one of the domains with greater 
relevance because there, resources that give rise and support organizations are 
concentrated, and is the instance for the most important decisions in terms of capital. 
Just few authors (Aronoff & Ward, 2002a; Betancourt, Gómez, & Lopez, 2011; 
Gómez-Betancourt, 2010; Jaffe & Lane, 2004) have highlighted the importance of 
knowing more about the ownership, its governance frameworks and strategies. Ownership 
is usually a system assumed implicit in the dynamics of management of enterprises, but it 
actually deserves more attention than a simple periodic control in the yearly General 
Shareholder´s Assembly. A family business that recognizes the ownership as an important 
issue, brings together shareholders to work on a common vision, develops a strategy to 
boost growth, agreed risk levels, generates liquidity and promotes profitability, while 
foreseeing contingencies and shielding against them through legal structures and 
consensual policies. 
Countries around the world have been inspired by the Anglo-American and the 
Continental European corporate governance models in order to minimize agency problems 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003), but in general the implementation of good corporate 
governance practices in family businesses is difficult, because their benefits are unclear. 
Good governance practices are seen as inspired by large corporations that are poorly linked 
to the business reality of the majority, i.e. micro, small and medium enterprises where 
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intuition reigns over professionalization. For this reason, it is not easy for many to link 
corporate governance with economic performance of companies, although important 
research such as that made by Klapper and Love (2004) or Anderson and Reeb (2003) have 
shown it. 
Statement of the Problem 
The economic crisis and financial frauds in recent decades have highlighted the 
poor quality and in many cases absence of good corporate governance practices, which has 
given rise to worldwide research to understand the problematic, but also the benefits 
derived from them. Multiple empirical studies have endeavored to demonstrate the 
relationship between the implementation of practices and economic performance 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Block, Jaskiewicz, & Miller, 2011; Brenes et al., 2011). The 
problem with these researches is that it has analyzed totally different roles and interests 
jointly, such as owners, boards of directors, management and auditors. This mixture can 
blur the role played by some of them and lead to erroneous conclusions. 
Colombia has also been a source of corporate governance studies, for example 
Gonzalez Guzman, Pombo, and Trujillo (2012) studied their relationship with ownership 
structures; Pombo and Gutierrez (2011) analyzed the influence of outside directors on 
corporate boards; Gómez-Betancourt, Lopez, Betancourt, and Millan (2012) discussed the 
relationship between ownership structure, practices and economic performance. But again, 
all research focused on the Board or in a mix of roles of ownership, governance and 
management, relegating the role of owners to background.  
Research in Colombia has identified that 74% of the shares of companies belong to 
one or two families (Pombo & Gutiérrez, 2011). Considering that family businesses 
represent the largest percentage of organizations in the national economy and also have 
particular dynamics that allow them to work together more frequently at the level of  
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property, it is necessary to developed studies targeting this type of companies. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative, longitudinal research is to determine the influence 
of ownership governance practices on the financial performance of Colombian family 
businesses. The study will analyze data from financial information reported by issuers of 
the National Registry of Values and Issuers (RNVE in Spanish), it will also use 
dichotomous data on the implementation of corporate governance practices of companies 
which filled the corporate governance survey Country Code of Colombia for the period 
2008-2014, and will classify the cases for family businesses or non-family businesses. 
Practices will be analyzed with three recognized national experts on corporate governance 
and family business with the aim to select the corporate governance practices directly 
linked with the ownership level. All resultant variables will be processed statistically with 
factor analysis to identify the main ones, and then, to identify practices that influence 
financial performance, an estimation of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is used 
to address the potential problem of endogeneity that is usual in corporate governance 
analysis (Akbar, Poletti-Hughes, El-Faitouri, & Shah, 2016). This research method is 
appropriate since this study is intended to make statistical generalizations.  
The methodology is appropriate for the proposed research because this study 
pretend to show a relationship between exogenous and endogenous variables, also 
generating prescriptive results that provide estimates of the potential impact of ownership 
corporate governance practices under the assumption that the family businesses´ owners 
follows the strategy to improve specific financial indicators. This study is relevant because 
it focuses on the study of corporate governance practices at the ownership level and its 
relationship to economic performance, and, if accepted, the research hypothesis encourages 
business owners to work on their implementation. 
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Significance of the Problem 
The field of study of the family business has evolved considerably since its 
inception three decades ago. Input from multiple authors has contributed to the 
understanding of its essence, the interpretation of its dynamics and the discovery of its 
distinctive capabilities against other companies (Habbershon & Williams, 1999). After a 
research review in the area of family businesses on corporate governance and its 
relationship with performance, it can be observed that researchers explore the board and 
the mananagement as exogenous variables, but apply in a very limited way family equity 
participation as a moderator variable. Schoolars like Brenes et al. (2011) have analized the 
impact on family business performance of governance structures at the board of directors 
level, Pombo and Gutiérrez (2011) find a relation of external directors and board interlocks 
with family firm performance, Gonzalez et al. (2012) identify the relation between family 
firms and better financial performance and growth respect variables as the management 
involvement of the founder, or the ownership control of family business groups, also 
authors like Kowalewski, Talavera, and Stetsyuk, (2010) identifyed in Polish family firms 
a relationship between performance and variables like the share of family ownership, the 
family CEOs, or Sciascia and Mazzola (2008) that found non-linear effects on performance 
of family involvement in ownership and management. 
This research will contribute to explain the influence of ownership governance 
practices on the performance of family business, in order to promote the implementation of 
the most relevant practices and prioritize efforts of family businesses. According to Danies 
(2006) in Colombia 69.5% of companies are family businesses, but participation varies 
according to company size, in small ones it is 77.4%, in medium ones it is 67.3%, in 
microenterprises it is 73.1% and in large family businesses it is 46.8%. Based on the 
aforementioned, it is undeniable that family businesses play an important role in the 
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national economy. Researchers have suggested governance practices and policies can 
create suitable conditions to face difficulties that afflict these businesses (Botero, Gomez, 
Betancourt, & Lopez, 2015; Mustakallio, Autio, & Zahra, 2002; Suess, 2014). Therefore, 
this research aims to provide incentives for families in businesses to implement best 
practices in their organizations, in first instance with an economic approach, but in the long 
term, thinking about the continuity of the company. 
Nature of the Study 
This longitudinal study will use a quantitative approach with a non-experimental 
design and an explanatory scope. The population is composed by companies listed on the 
National Registry of Securities and Issuers of Colombia during a seven years period, the 
sample will be selected on a non-random basis and will be analyze with factor analysis and 
GMM, assuming that there are panels with few time-series options and a large sample, 
variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects and have endogeneity (Roodman, 2006). 
Also using an adequate size of the sample, that according with Green (2010) should be 
more than 50 + 8 (per variable) for testing an overall model. 
The population, constituted by Colombian publically offered companies, will be 
classified in family businesses, when one family is identified as the majority controlling 
shareholder a non-family businesses if proven otherwise. Practices promoted by the 
Country Code (Código País in Spanish) were analyzed with a panel of experts in order to 
identify those that are related with ownership governance, and those that have a greater 
impact on firm performance. 
Research Questions 
This research pretends to identify the relation and influence of corporate 
governance practices at the level of owners and the financial performance in family firms, 
for this reason the research question is: 
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To what extent do ownership governance practices influence financial performance 
on family businesses? 
Hypotheses 
After a research review of family business literature on corporate governance and 
its relationship with financial performance it can be observed that researchers explore the 
board and the mananagement as exogenous variables, but apply in a very limited way the 
family equity participation as moderator variable. Schoolars like Brenes et al. (2011) have 
analized the impact of governance structures at the level of board of directors on family 
business performance. They identified that more formal boards of directors provide better 
non-financial benefits than family companies compared to their competitors, some of these 
aspects are business knowledge, active participation, and support in business management. 
Pombo and Gutierrez (2011) studied the characteristics of the Board and its relation with 
ROE and ROA. They find a relation of external directors and board interlocks with family 
businessses performance in terms of econometric results, where external directors, in 
particular the busy ones, have a positive influence on ROA. Additionally they found the 
possitive influence of variables such as ownership control of the families and the 
blockholder contestability, that will be included in the the present document´s model. 
Sciascia and Mazzola (2008) studied a SEMS sample but did not find a significant 
relationship between family involvement and performance. Its main contribution was to 
identify that non-listed companies have different behavior from public offered companies 
have been characterized as presenting positive relations between their ownership and 
governance characteristics with financial performance. Additionally, in SMES they found a 
negative quadratic relation that indicates that at a certain point the influence of the family 
begins to be a disadvantage for the organization. 
Gonzalez et al. (2012) identify with a regression analysis the relation between  
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family firms and its better financial performance in terms of ROA respect variables as the 
management involvement of the founder, or the ownership control of family business 
groups. They found that the direct or indirect control of dominant family ownership groups 
influences positively, with a decreasing effect relative to a greater size of the company. 
Authors like Kowalewski et al. (2010) identified in Polish family companies that an 
inverted U-shape relationship between family involvement in ownership and management 
with financial performance exists. Those authors used GMM due the possible endogeneity 
of family ownership, and found that a moderate family influence improve the financial 
performance from the point of view of the stakeholders.  
Following these findings, this study expects a positive effect on the financial 
performance, in terms of profitability of assets, of companies owned by a dominant family 
shareholder group, and with more practices of corporate governance at the ownership level. 
The preceding arguments lead to the following hypothesis and causality matrix (see Table 
1): 
Hypothesis: To higher ownership governance practices, the higher the financial 
performance of Colombian family business. 
Table 1. 
Causality Matrix 
 Y X1 > Ownership Governance 
Practices 
X2 Family Business 
β1 Y1 > ROA + + 
β2 Y2 > ROE + + 
β3 Y3 > ROCE + + 
 
Theoretical Framework 
This explanatory study aims to explain the influence of ownership governance 
practices on the performance of family businesses, in terms of profitability of assets, 
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because this ratio reflects the good or bad functioning of the company without going into 
detail on efficiency in the use of capital or debt as would other financial ratios. This is 
especially important in the study of family businesses that are characterized by the use of 
differential strategies to manage their finances (Gomez-Betancourt et al., 2012), by 
multiple reasons such as taxation, book keeping, control or family, which is why focus is 
needed in general indicators of economic performance. The combination of Agency 
Theory and Stewardship Theory allows arguing that the principal aim is to maximize 
benefits and align interests with the agent to minimize problems and risks. 
According to Jensen and Meckling, (1976) Agency Theory is useful to analyze this 
cause-effect relationship, because in an agency relationship, the principal seeks to 
maximize its benefits, and for that reason hires the agent is to work on its behalf. With 
autonomous management allowing maximizing profits, the problem is that the objectives 
of the principal and the agent are not always aligned. On the other hand, there are inherent 
characteristics to the family business´ nature that were explained through Stewardship 
Theory, for example topics related with non-financial goals (Westhead & Howorth, 2006), 
deep emotional investment in the family (Bubolz, 2001), shareholder’s personal 
satisfaction (motivation), socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Larraza-
Kintana, 2010) and reputation (Ward, 2004). 
It is relevant to study family businesses due to its predominance in economies 
(Holderness, 2009) and its contribution to the generation of employment and of wealth of 
countries (Shanker & Astrachan, 1996). 
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X2 Family
business
influence
(>ownership
control)
X1 Ownership
governance
practices
(from the
Country Code)
Financial
performance 
(Y1 ROA, 
Y2 ROE, Y3
ROCE)
 
Figure 1. Research framework about the influence of ownership governance practices on 
the financial performance of family business. 
Definition of Terms 
This study takes three definitions into account. At first, corporate governance is a 
group of mechanisms and practices through which interested parties control and protect 
information and corporate management (John & Senbet, 1998), and in this study is meant 
by Governance Practices Ownership all mechanisms available to shareholders to make 
decisions, control, understand and evaluate their assets (Gomez-Betancourt, Zapata-
Cuervo, & Betancourt-Ramírez, 2016). Based on Villalonga and Amit (2006), this study 
defined the Family Business as the company where a family shareholder group has the 
highest proportion of voting rights.  
Finally, financial performance in family business is studied mainly through the 
ROA (Klapper & Love, 2004), ROE (Brown & Caylor, 2009), debt (Gallo, Tapies, & 
Cappuyns, 2000) and sales growth (Gomez-Betancourt et al., 2012), but this study will be 
focused on the Return On Assets (see, e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Gonzalez et al., 2012) 
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and Return On Equity (see, e.g. Brown & Caylor, 2009). These financial indicators will 
make possible to identify the final result of the firm and compare the results with previous 
international studies. 
Assumptions 
This study was designed based on two assumptions, first that the theories of agency 
and stewardship reflect the phenomenon to be studied in Colombia, furthermore it is 
assumed that Colombian family businesses are managed in a similar way as in developed 
countries, where other studies have been developed. 
Limitations 
One limitation of the study is that the responses of the companies in the Country 
Code survey are not sincere, this may be due to the need to report appropriate information 
to the control entity that applied the survey or because they seek to promote a message of 
confidence to the investor market. 
Delimitations 
This research will study ownership corporate governance practices included in the 
Country Code. The companies listed in the RNVE are the largest economic organizations 
in the country and it is supposed that they have the best governance practices to ensure 
transparency and investor’s confidence. This study is delimited to: (a) companies with high 
levels of formality rather than micro and SME; (b) companies that belong to the 
Colombian capital market; (c) companies with a similar cultural background as Latin 
America; and (d) companies with family control as common denominator. 
Summary 
The present research seeks to explain the influence of key ownership governance 
practices, which appear in the Country Code, on financial performance, in terms of ROA, 
ROE and ROCE, of public offered family businesses registered in RNVE, in order to 
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promote the implementation of the most relevant governance practices and prioritize 
efforts of family businesses. Well exploited family business can generate significantly 
better results than other competing companies (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Gonzalez et al., 
2012; Klapper & Love, 2004). 
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Chapter 2 : Review of the Literature 
The present research aims to explain the influence of ownership governance 
practices on financial performance of family businesses, in order to promote the 
implementation of the most relevant practices and prioritize efforts of family businesses. 
Despite the great effort to minimize agency problems in multiple countries through codes 
of corporate governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003) and the large number of studies on 
corporate governance in family businesses developed in Latin America, Spain and Portugal 
focused on understanding structures and processes of corporate governance (Lagos & 
Botero, 2016), there is still a gap in the literature on corporate governance at the ownership 
level and its relation to financial performance. Although it is worth noting that recognized 
studies analyze corporate governance and its performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Brown & Caylor, 2009; Gomez-Betancourt et al., 2012; Gonzalez et al., 2012; Klapper & 
Love, 2004), they do so by concentrating on Boards of Directors and Management, which 
is why, on another perspective, this study highlights the role of owners in decision making 
and company control. 
The structure of the literature review was designed to facilitate the implementation 
of the research and fulfilling its objectives. The literature review presents an introduction 
with tendencies of research in the field of family business and corporate governance, then 
referring to the three major components of this study, the first part discusses corporate 
governance practices in family businesses, the second part describes ownership in family 
businesses and the third part presents the issue of performance in family businesses. In 
order to analyze the main concepts concerning this research, the following literature 
analysis is to be developed in this chapter, Appendix A presents a literature map that 
concentrates the main aspects in the thematic as well as the relations between the main 
concepts, and the Appendix B presents the theoretical framework which supports the 
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analysis of corporate governance practices in a fragmented way, specifically at the 
ownership level. 
Literature Review 
Kumar and Zattoni, (2016) analyzed the attention that captures in the academic 
community the issue of family businesses, which is not surprising considering that (Zattoni 
& Judge, 2012) control of property by the families not only apply to SMES, but also to 
large companies traded on the stock exchange. In a Special Issue on family governance 
Memili, Singal and Barredy (2016) emphasized that family businesses are a key 
component in global economies, but due to lack of knowledge about them in terms of 
corporate governance is still needed more research in this line, because the multiple 
configurations that can be implemented generate different types of impact on their 
behavior, results and strategies. Memili et al. (2016) especially highlighted the possibility 
of obtaining different results in the studies, when applied in different countries and 
cultures. This has been evident in the existing literature where have been found positive 
and negative effects of family ownership on the strategies and performance of this type of 
companies (Kumar & Zattoni, 2016).  
Some characteristics of family firms allow them to act differently compared to their 
competitors in the same industry (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2012). Despite the 
dichotomy present in the literature, some authors have identified that the empirical 
evidence supports a greater positive impact of family control (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, 
Berrone, & de Castro, 2011). In the literature, it is increasingly common to study the effect 
of corporate governance on family firms in both quantitative and non-economic aspects. 
For example Suyono (2016) recently study the influence of family-controlled firm and 
corporate governance mechanisms on corporate performance founding a positive relation 
with corporate performance seen as Tobin´s Q and ROA, even though the relationship with 
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the variables of governance was not confirmed. Of course some articles analyze corporate 
governance from the role of the board, its configuration and its ability to implement norms 
and skills to influence business performance or their behavior (Bauweraerts & Colot, 2017; 
Zattoni, Gnan, & Huse, 2015). Others also noted the existence of non-economic goals 
derived from the control that the owning family drives the company through the governing 
bodies (Chrisman, Memili, & Misra, 2014). According to scholars (Madison, Holt, 
Kellermanns, & Ranft, 2016), research on governance and performance issues should be 
addressed with the Agency and stewardship theories, which, despite appearing to be 
contrary at first sight, explain the phenomenon of corporate governance in predicting 
results, reason why this study will use both optics to analyze the phenomenon of interest. 
The following is a literature review that is limited to the research model that has been 
concretely presented in Appendix A. 
Research Model 
As evidenced previously, research on corporate governance in the family business 
defines the concept of ownership as a central axis, because it is the most visible way to 
identify family businesses in data analysis with large volume. The role of ownership in 
family businesses is much deeper than that, but in this area of research, academics have 
simply used it as a definition or control variable, not taking into account that it is a system 
that needs to be managed (Betancourt et al., 2011). The authors of the F-PEC scale 
(Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002) pointed out in their article the need for a widely-
accepted definition of family business, although they endeavored to propose a measure of 
family influence in business through power, experience and culture. The possibility of 
having an agreement among academics on a single definition is still far off. Some authors 
(Lopez‐Gracia & Sanchez‐Andujar, 2007) used this scale to analyze the financial structure 
of family businesses and performance, their results not showed significant differences for 
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most measures of financial performance, probably by limiting the analysis to a single 
family, when several families can influence in organizational culture. Although other 
authors have identified behaviors such as those of single-family companies in companies 
belonging to three controlling families (three or less families’ shareholding above 50%) 
(Gomez et al., 2012), it is still more accepted to consider as family businesses those with 
single family ownership, where a family shareholder group has the highest proportion of 
voting rights (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
The next axis is corporate governance that can be influenced by the family. Lagos 
and Botero (2016) indicated that in this type of companies’ corporate governance can be 
developed for family, business and patrimonial systems. Corporate governance should be 
understood as the group of mechanisms with which stakeholders exert control over 
information and management (John & Senbet, 1998). For example, in the family system 
owner families can have a family council, which will concentrate the structures and 
procedures to help the family organize and manage the family-business relationship 
(Berent-Braun & Uhlaner, 2012). In the business system, the Board of Directors is the 
decision-making body that directs to achieve the objectives (Gersick & Feliu, 2014), and 
design the strategy, along with help of top managers who are responsible for day-to-day 
management and strategy implementation (Gomez et al., 2016). Finally, in the ownership 
system, which is the sphere of competence of this research, there are two decision-making 
spaces, on the one hand a Shareholder´s Assembly exercises control and decision making 
to influence the macro strategy of the company, and on the other, an Owner´s Council 
helps owners with the periodic development of topics of interest to family owners, like 
accounting, legal, diversification, synergies, risks and return parameters (Gomez et al., 
2016). 
The final axis, which can be influenced by the other two, is performance,  
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understood as the measurement of results, that can be qualitative based on perceptions or 
quantitative. Several studies address performance from different perspectives. Some 
authors analyze the long term as the family-influenced on firms whose performance goal is 
transgenerational wealth, wealth growth and rent generation potential (Habbershon, 
Williams, & MacMillan 2003), others studied firm performance as the perception of 
conflict, satisfaction, commitment, harmony (Beehr, Drexler, & Faulkner, 1997) or the 
impact on agency costs (Dyer, 2006). Scholars have also studied it from efficiency, by 
analyzing the capital structure of firms controlled by an owner family that are more 
efficient, have great value and less debt (McConaughy, Matthews, & Fialko, 2001). Recent 
studies explored the entrepreneurial orientation and the relation between risk taking and 
performance (Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjöberg, & Wiklund, 2007). Finally it has been a constant 
the creation of studies that seek to understand the relations of variables on measures of 
financial performance as Tobins´Q (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), ROE (Brown & Caylor, 
2009), ROA (Klapper & Love, 2004), Sales growth (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; 
Gomez-Betancourt et al., 2012), Size, Margins (Daily & Dollinger, 1992), Debt (Gallo et 
al., 2000), among others. A more detailed literature review of each of these axes is 
presented below. 
Corporate governance practices in family businesses 
Corporate governance is a concept that has been gaining importance in the 
academic and business environment due to ethical problems that have led to financial 
crises with global impact. The traditional concept of corporate governance refers to 
safeguarding the interests of the owners to minimize agency problems (Tirole, 2001). 
According to John and Senbet (1998) corporate governance is a group of mechanisms by 
which stakeholders exert control over information and executive management of the 
company. The great contribution made by the corporate governance for shareholders and 
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bondholders, is to serve as a reliable instrument to support investments in companies where 
managers seek to reduce the risk (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000a). 
This research analyzes corporate governance in a practical way, using practices to dilute 
the power in decision-making through the separating of ownership and management 
control (Gillan, 2006). 
Corporate governance practices should be understood in this study as all initiatives 
that seek to structure the decision-making and control of the property and administrators. 
Those practices can come from two sources, hard law that forces companies to comply 
with certain requirements and soft law which are initiatives of private and multilateral 
institutions that invite organizations to implement agreements that are more demanding 
than the laws of a country (Gomez-Betancourt & Zapata, 2013). 
In some environments family businesses implement governance practices (e.g. 
dividends) to build trust in the market, to align with the interests of investors (Pindado, 
Requejo, & De la Torre, 2012) and to avoid deprive of rights minority shareholders (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000b). Due to the above it becomes 
important to analyze governance practices in family businesses. 
Ownership in family business 
Family businesses ownership is a bridge between the family and the business 
(Distelberg & Sorenson, 2009), which goals, culture and family values are transmitted 
through governance bodies (Aronoff & Ward, 2002b; Habbershon & Astrachan, 1997; 
Tower, Gudmundson, Schierstedt, & Hartman, 2007) to intricate systems that involve 
people, resources, interests and feelings, reason why it is necessary to use a clear structure 
to control and manage investments (Jaffe & Lane, 2004). 
In this document ownership is understood as the ability to use and control the use 
of objects (Rudmin & Berry, 1987), but it is necessary to clarify that ownership in the 
19 
family business is not only used to pursue economic interests. According to Davis, 
Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997) owners link emotional investments to the company 
(Bubolz, 2001), reason why they pursue individual objectives as personal satisfaction and 
professional achievement, or transcendent goals as reputation, legacy or social capital 
(Ward, 2004). 
Some scholars (De Jong, Mertens, & Roosemboom, 2004) have studied the role 
played by shareholders in the corporate governance of companies through the general 
shareholder’s assembly, but although this is an important mechanism to enforce their 
rights, is not the one they must concentrate on. Owners should be prepared to have the 
skills required to exercise their role, because this is not something that comes naturally 
(Aronoff & Ward, 2002a). Gomez-Betancourt and Zapata (2013) suggest that the General 
Shareholder´s Assembly takes decisions on the choice of the auditor, the choice of the 
Board of Directors members and their respective allocation of fees, as well as decisions 
relating to investments or divestments outside the Board´s scope, allocation of dividends, 
bylaw reform, debt policy, share transaction policy, social responsibility policy, among 
others. 
In family businesses, as well as in any other company, there are multiple owners 
profiles with diverse interests. Aronoff and Ward (2002a) identified a few (e.g. operating, 
governing, involved, passive, investor and proud owner). These profiles help to understand 
the expectations of shareholders, but in most cases, they do not have a broad willingness to 
follow a large number of recommendations on governance practices to be implemented, 
which is why this study seeks to identify the practices from the corporate governance of 
ownership that have a greater impact on financial performance. 
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Financial Performance 
Family members can influence the firm performance through expectations 
shareholders have about the organization. Gomez, Lopez and Betancourt (2009) found a 
positive relationship between ownership, family vision and sales growth in family SMES. 
Research about family businesses and performance has applied multiple indicators 
to measure as dependent variables. One of the most used and reliable measures is sales 
growth (Murphy, Trailer, & Hill, 1996; Dess & Robinson, 1984), because it reveals 
behavior of firms over time without accounting changes that businessmen tend to apply to 
reduce taxes. Others are more inclined to apply multiple measures such as Buchanan, 
Netter, and Yang (2010) who analyzed the profitability, dividend payments, level of 
indebtedness and price of the shares, regarding decisions taken by the General 
Shareholder´s Assembly.  
Multiple authors (Prevost & Rao, 2000; Wahal, 1996) have studied the actions 
taken by the General Shareholder´s Assembly concerning the value of the firm, focusing 
on short-term behavior of the stock market and profitability of the firm in the long term. In 
mature markets usually business performance has been studied through Earnings Before 
Interest, Taxes, Depreciation And Amortization (EBITDA). Some authors have analyzed 
the operating performance of the firms taking the EBITDA divided by assets (Kowalewski 
et al., 2010). Other studies use performance indicators such as the ROE (Brown & Caylor, 
2009), debt (Gallo et al., 2000) and sales growth (Gomez-Betancourt et al., 2012). Return 
on Assets (ROA) is another indicator used in emerging markets on imperfect capital 
markets with usually high level of debt (Chang & Choi, 1988). Recognized authors 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003) used Tobin´s Q as a market-based measure, but in the case of 
Colombian market is not possible to use it because the number of stocks of the equity 
issuers with market liquidity is small (<20%) (Gonzalez et al., 2012). 
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There are many authors who have addressed the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance, but it is important to note that not all indicators are 
useful for observing the effects that can be generated by shareholders, the Board, 
committees or management in business results. For example, studies on Board committees 
(Lam, & Lee, 2012) used measures such as return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) 
Return On Capital Employed (ROCE), and the market-to-book value of equity (MTBV). In 
this study, MTBV ratio could not be used because it seeks to measure the capacity to 
generate money from the available capital, which is responsibility of management or Board 
level. Other authors who have analyzed the relationship of CEO succession to performance 
(Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pérez-González, & Wolfenzon, 2007) have observed more 
operational measures such as the Operating Return on Assets (OROA) or the ratio of 
earnings before interest And taxes (EBIT). Also from another perspective, some authors 
(Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001) have studied different facets of corporate governance 
with Economic Value Added (EVA), without finding significant relationships. 
Taking into account the above, this study will use two indicators, the ROE (Brown 
& Caylor, 2009), the ROA (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Klapper & Love, 2004; Sciascia & 
Mazzola, 2008) and the ROCE (Lam & Lee, 2012) which have been used by the most 
representative studies in the area of family business that relate financial performance and 
the influence of the owner-family, therefore the results of this research can be compared 
with them. 
Conclusion 
This review of literature shows that corporate governance is becoming increasingly 
relevant because it allows owners to exercise their right of decision-making and control the 
board and management. Nevertheless, literature has assumed that owners play a passive 
role in front of their companies, although authors like Aronoff and Ward (2002a) have 
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described the variety of profiles and interests that exist inside those stigmatized groups. 
Some experts (Lagos & Botero, 2016) have identified that large part of literature on 
corporate governance of family businesses in Latin America, Spain and Portugal largely 
focus on Boards of Directors. Because of the above it is highly relevant to understand the 
role of the owners through governance bodies and best corporate governance practices that 
could exercise influence on economic performance, as demonstrated by other studies that 
analyzed ownership in conjunction with board of directors and management of the firm. 
Summary 
This chapter presents the theoretical background of the concepts and theories in 
family businesses specifying three variables: corporate governance practices, ownership 
and financial performance in family businesses. These concepts provide the bases for 
testing the research model that pretends to explain the influence of ownership governance 
practices on the financial performance of family businesses. As noted in the analysis of 
multiple authors, there is a gap in the literature on corporate governance of family 
business, which until now has been overlooked by many researchers or had to be taken for 
granted because of the difficulty of accessing carefully gathered information about the 
owner-families. To meet the objective of this research the next chapter will develop the 
methodology and the operationalization of these concepts. 
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Chapter 3 : Method 
Taking into account the gap of the literature on corporate governance from the 
ownership level in family businesses, the main objective of this research aims to explain 
the influence of ownership governance practices on their financial performance. This 
chapter describes the design, the process, the sample characteristics, the validity and 
reliability that were outlined in this study. 
In general terms, the approach of this research will be quantitative; the study will 
take numerical data from financial information reported by issuers of RNVE, and also will 
discuss dichotomous data on the implementation of corporate governance practices 
assessed by the Country Code. Data will be analyzed statistically with factor analysis and 
estimation of GMM. 
The research scope will be explanatory and aims to establish the relationship 
between the ownership governance practices and the financial performance on family 
businesses registered in the RNVE. Additionally, the inherent ownership governance 
practices that generate greater impact on performance will be identified to be promoted 
among the shareholders and thus produce greater practical impact on the business 
community. 
Research Design 
The research design will be quantitative and non-experimental because there will 
be no manipulation of variables. Information was collected from secondary sources such as 
the RNVE and the Country Code, both taken from public databases. In addition, the 
research will examine the information during the period 2008-2014, which represents a 
longitudinal study. 
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Appropriateness of Design 
The purpose of this quantitative longitudinal research is to determine the influence 
of ownership governance practices on the financial performance of Colombian family 
businesses. The study will fulfil the assumptions of factor analysis (Field, 2009, p. 247) 
and GMM (Roodman, 2006) using continuous and dichotomous variables, a sample 
selected on a non-random basis, checking aspects as normal distribution, assuming that 
there are panels with few time-series options and a large sample, and uncorrelated 
variables with the fixed effects and endogeneity in corporate governance data. Also, the 
study use an adequate size of sample, that according with Green (1991) should be 50 + 8 
(per variable) for testing an overall model. 
Research Question 
Under a positivist epistemological position this quantitative and longitudinal 
research aims to determine the relationship between ownership governance practices and 
financial performance of Colombian family businesses. One research question will be 
solved with this study: 
To what extent do ownership governance practices influence financial performance 
on family businesses? 
Population 
The population object of this study will be family businesses identified in the 
database of the RNVE of Colombia during the years 2008-2014, which have also filled the 
Country Code survey on governance practices. The origin of both sources of information is 
public and official. The RNVE aims to inscribe and certify classes of securities, types of 
securities and their issuers must also register emissions carried out by them. The 
registration is a requirement for all entities that want to make a public offering of its 
securities or in a trading system. 
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104 companies were identified. 66 of which were classified as non-family-
businesses (NFB) and 38 as family-businesses (FB). The companies were grouped into six 
economic sectors, 42 companies carried out activities in the financial sector (28 NFB and 
14 FB), 18 in the industrial sector (9 NFB and 9 FB), 11 in the agribusiness sector (3 NFB 
and 8 FB) 12 in the services sector (8 NFB and 4 FB), 6 in the Construction sector (3 NFB 
and 3 FB) and 15 in the public services sector (all NFB). 
Informed Consent 
Taking into consideration that the data is available to the public and was collected 
by the national control entity called Superfinanciera, informed consent is not required. The 
RNVE is a register that must be fill the public companies by obligation. In addition, the 
information from the Country Code1 survey is answered by the issuers of securities in 
Colombia as a requirement. There are 41 recommended corporate governance practices of 
voluntary adoption. To evaluate their compliance, the Country Code survey is composed of 
80 questions structured under the "comply or explain" principle, where they answer 
affirmatively if they incorporate a practice or if not, they can explain the reasons for not 
doing so. 
On the other hand, the consulted experts, before being interviewed, received the 
informed consent that appears in Appendix C. 
Sampling Frame 
In this research, random sampling by clusters was used having as sample units FB 
and NFB. Being a probabilistic sampling, all individuals in the sample have the same 
probability of being chosen for the analysis, in this case when they meet the requirements 
of complete information for financial and corporate governance data, from the database of 
 
1 The corporate governance code for issuers in Colombia (Country Code) and its 41 practices are available at: 
https://www.superfinanciera.gov.co/SFCant/Codigopais/textos/codigopias.pdf. The country code survey is 
available at: https://www.superfinanciera.gov.co/SFCant/Codigopais/anexo1.html 
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RNVE of Colombia during the years 2008-2014 and also the Country Code survey of 
governance practices. According to Zeger and Karim (1991) observations may be obtained 
in clusters in longitudinal studies, using linear regression models such as GMM, but 
controlling correlations and random effects of responses between groups. 
To study the influence of ownership governance practices on the financial 
performance of Colombian´ family business, it was necessary to build a database with 
corporate governance information available in the Country Code survey, also financial 
information of public companies, and to elaborated the FB classification according to 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) where a family shareholder group has the highest proportion 
of voting rights. 
It is important to clarify that the Country Code survey is applicable to all 
companies that have securities registered in the RNVE; With the exception of the national 
treasure, mutual funds, autonomous funds managed by trust companies, and others 
mentioned in Law 546 of 1999, territorial entities mentioned in Article 286 of the 
Constitution, multilateral lending agencies, foreign governments, foreign government 
agencies, branches of foreign companies and foreign entities (Superintendencia Financiera, 
2014). 
The Country Code provides 41 recommendations in the following aspects of 
corporate governance: (a) General Shareholder´s Assembly, (b) Board, (c) Financial and 
non-financial Disclosure, and (d) Resolution of disputes. Due to the fact that through 
Circular 028 (Superintendencia Financiera, 2014) the Country Code survey was updated to 
global developments in corporate governance, this research only analyzes the information 
until 2014. In the following years, the measures were reduced from 41 to 33, but from 80 
questions passed to 148 recommendations, which does not make it possible to standardize 
the information to extend the period of analysis. Now measures are grouped as follows: (a) 
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Equity rights and fairness of shareholders, (b) General Assembly of shareholders, (c) 
Board of Directors, (d) Control architecture, and (e) Financial and Not Financial 
Information Transparency. For purposes of this research information of the corporate 
governance practices asked in the previous surveys was used. 
Confidentiality 
The Country Code is diligence under the principle of "comply or explain". The 
recommendations are adopted voluntarily. Likewise, public companies have the obligation 
to inform the market and to send the Country Code annual survey to Superintendencia 
Financiera. It stresses that the new Country Code indicated that companies registered in the 
RNVE should include a clause where its directors and officers are required to comply with 
the recommendations that each company has voluntarily adopted in its bylaws 
(Superintendencia Financiera, 2014). 
Geographic Location 
This study is applied to all entities that have securities registered in the RNVE in 
the Colombian territory. 
Instrumentation 
The Financial Superintendence annually publishes financial data from the RNVE 
firms regarding the 80 questions related with corporate governance practices of the 
Country Code survey. The country code 'survey can be found in 
https://www.superfinanciera.gov.co/SFCant/Codigopais/anexo1.html. 
For the purposes of this research, the instrument and the information reported is 
considered is reliable because it comes from the control entity for publicly traded 
companies. 
Since this research uses secondary, public and official information considered 
highly reliable and with an instrument applied in a constant way during the mentioned 
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years, the Cronbach's alpha will be used as the instrument's internal validation method, 
where the minimum acceptable value will be 0.7 and below that value the internal 
consistency will be considered low (Oviedo & Campo-Arias, 2005). 
Data Collection 
The research requires to build a database that passed through three stages, first of 
all, the Country Code´s information survey will be collected, then the financial information 
of the companies included in the sample will be found, and finally companies will be 
classified in FB when meeting the criteria of Villalonga and Amit (2006) limited to a 
family shareholder group that has the highest proportion of voting rights. In Colombia, 
information of shareholders of public companies is available, but information of 
shareholder companies is private for security reasons, but a strategy will be used to identify 
common surnames in shareholders, boards of directors and/or CEO positions, in other 
cases public information for companies that are recognized as family owned was used. 
On the other hand, Country Code information contains a mixture of corporate 
governance practices that must go through a selection process. To do this, practices 
corresponding to the level of ownership will be extracted with the help of three recognized 
experts in the field who will be interviewed, analyzing the Country Code´s 41 practices 
and interview information will be collected in the format presented in Appendix D. An 
excerpt from the interviews will be attached at the end of the document comparing the 
results. Corporate governance practices of the ownership that are selected by at least two of 
the three experts will be processed statistically with factorial analysis and the GMM 
estimates will allow to make statistical generalizations concerning the objective of this 
research. 
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Data Analysis 
The steps that covered by this research are (a) sieving, which involves the 
application of interviews to three experts on corporate governance in FB to identify the 
corporate governance practices of ownership that are contemplated in the Country Code. 
For this purpose the experts will previously receive via email the Country Code Survey 
requesting them to identify the practices inherent to the owners, and in the interview they 
will be asked to support their motives for zed classification; (b) the execution in which the 
financial and corporate governance data is prepared, classified and statistically analyzed; 
and (c) the final report writing with the findings, suggestions for future research, 
theoretical and practical implications. 
To study the relationship between performance and the application of ownership 
corporate governance practices in FB, a fixed effects model will be used in a balanced 
panel data. Fixed effects are dummy variables for each year of the sample (2008-2014) and 
six economic sectors are represented as dummy variables (financial, industrial, agro-
industrial, services, construction and utilities). 
The variables considered in the model are the following: 
Dependent variables: According to Gomez et al. (2012) in this type of studies it is 
necessary to minimize the impact of the financial maneuvers of Colombian companies to 
lower their taxes, which is why the After-Tax Operating Income (ATOI) will be used in the 
numerator of the ROA and ROE, because it reflects the Operational efficiency when 
considering only the expenses related to the operation. This measure of performance 
avoids bias for business decisions such as dividends, interest or leverage. It is calculated as 
Gross Revenue minus Operating Expenses, Depreciation and Taxes. Consistent with the 
above, Financial Performance will be measure with Return on Assets (ROA) calculated as 
the ratio between ATOI and Total Assets, Return on Equity (ROE) calculated as the ratio 
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between AOTI and Total Equity and Return On Capital Employed (ROCE) understood as 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by the subtraction of total assets and 
current liabilities. 
Independent variables: (a) from the selection of corporate governance practices of 
the ownership identified in interviews with experts, a factor analysis will be applied with 
varimax rotation (Kaiser, 1958) because this technique can identify correlations between 
variables and calculate a smaller number of factors that allow to maximizing their 
interpretation. The resulting factors will be used as independent variables of ownership´ 
corporate governance. (b) Businesses will be classified as FB when a family shareholder 
group has the highest proportion of voting rights (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
Control variables: Consistent with empirical research on family business, variables 
will be included to control the characteristics of enterprises. The variable size represents 
the size of the company and is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, which has 
been used in renowned research (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) because the natural logarithm 
reduces the scale number without affecting their properties, which for this study is very 
appropriate because of the use of an indicators on a scale from zero to 100 and assets 
equivalent to billions. % Shares Family is a variable that indicates the ownership of 
families. Sector dummy variable rank companies according to economic activity, in this 
case, the defined sectors are: financial, industrial, agro-industrial, services, construction 
and utilities. 
To measure the ownership corporate governance influence, a factor analysis 
technique will be applied to reduce the number of practices to analyze. By this process 
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 will be extracted to explain the highest possible 
percentage of variance. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and the control 
variables will be summarized; the results for the sample of FB will be presented. The 
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results of the GMM estimation for the dependent variable ROA, ROE and ROCE will be 
presented. 
Validity and Reliability 
The research present several methodological aspects that validate criteria of validity 
and reliability as presented below. The first point to be mentioned is that this research was 
concerned with making a theoretical contribution (Whetten, 1989) explaining a 
phenomenon of interest that integrates in factors the most relevant corporate governance 
practices of ownership and excludes others that add little value but are promoted by the 
control entities. Regarding internal validity, the document will reflect how the research 
process and data analysis allowed to advance from a clear research question “To what 
extent do ownership governance practices influence financial performance on family 
businesses?” to conclusions. Words used in the question and the conclusions will reflect 
key aspects like financial performance, ownership and corporate governance practices, 
showing a knowledge advance in comparison to previous literature. Following the internal 
validity concept of Yin (2003, p. 34), the explanatory scope of this research led to establish 
causal relationships between a given condition and the result, with a common thread that 
ensures that what is said to be researched is research actually being carried out.  
On the other hand, theoretical context will be used mentioning cites of several 
scholars, this theoretical framework provides external validity to the concept of financial 
performance and ownership corporate governance practices, which throughout the paper 
and especially on the findings will be elevated to a general dimension, in other words, the 
general concept of research will be applicable to other groups or populations with similar 
characteristics in different countries. This point is linked to the inferential external validity 
that is provided in the sampling frame that gives context to the studied businesses and the 
descriptive statistics of the sample. The characteristics and context mentioned therein may  
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be relevant to other FB that share similar aspects. 
The document showed a validation strategy support in each step of the process to 
build the database, to identify practices linked with ownership level of corporate 
governance and analyze data in a theoretical context that allows drawing conclusions with 
strong arguments based on empirical data. In general terms, this article will stablish the 
external validity to do generalizations based on the study of representative sample, 
although in strengths, limitations, and future research. 
Additionally, the Country Code Survey asks companies about their behavior and 
requests descriptions of the past, so it is likely that the data has a potential common method 
bias (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986), which is why factor analysis is used to improve the 
validity of the study through the identification of common aspects among the practices 
analyzed. 
In this document the criteria of experts in Colombian corporate governance 
practices and in family businesses is triangulated through interviews, joint analysis of 
primary and secondary information of documents triangulated provides higher levels of 
confidence in the quality of the data and results. In line with the proposal of some authors 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) to increase the reliability of the study a 
check of the findings will be carried out with third parties, which in principle will be the 
same experts interviewed. 
Summary 
This chapter presents the methodology, explains the design, the process, the sample 
characteristics, the validity and reliability of the research. The analysis of relationship 
between corporate governance practices and financial performance of family businesses 
commonly use quantitative measurements as dependent variable (Dyer, 2006). This 
research pretends to study ownership corporate governance practices in order to promote 
33 
the implementation of the most relevant practices. To do so, official information was 
collected from the RNVE and from the Country Code Survey. Factor analysis and GMM 
will be used to analyze data, recognizing that GMM is recommended for analyzing 
corporate governance practices that usually have endogeneity (Akbar et al., 2016). These 
aspects stablish the bases to analyze data in the next chapter. 
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Appendix A: Literature Map 
Figure A2. 
Literature map of ownership governance practices and performance of family business. 
Corporate governance
Group of mechanisms with which 
stakeholders exert control over information 
and executive management (John & Senbet, 
1998)
Family council
Structures and procedures help the family to 
organize and manage the family-business 
relationship (Berent-Braun & Uhlaner, 2012)
Board of Directors
Decision-making body that directs to 
achieve the objectives, and design the 
strategy (Gersick & Feliu, 2014)
Top managers
Responsible for day-to-day management 
and strategy implementation (Gómez et al., 
2016)
Shareholder Assembly
Exercise control and decision making to 
influence the macro strategy of the 
company (Gómez et al., 2016)
Owners Council
Helps owners with accounting, legal, 
diversification, synergies, risks and return 
parameters (Gómez et al., 2016)
Performance
Measurement of results. Can be 
qualitative based on perceptions or 
quantitative
Long term
Rent generation potential (Habbershon et 
al., 2003)
Firm performance
Conflict, satisfaction, commitment, 
harmony; familial assets and lower 
agency costs (Beehr et al., 1997; Dyer, 
2006)
Entrepreneurial orientation
Risk taking, and performance (Naldi, et 
al. 2007)
Efficiency
Capital structure (McConaughy et al., 
2001)
Financial performance
Tobins´Q; ROE; ROA; ROCE; Sales 
growth; Size, margins; debt (Dyer 2006)
Ownership in Family 
Business (Betancourt et 
al., 2011)
Family influence
F-PEC measure power, 
experience and culture 
(Astrachan et al., 2002)
Single family business
A family shareholder group
has the highest proportion
of voting rights (Villalonga 
& Amit, 2006)
Multi-family business
Enterprises with majority
family ownership structures
(Gómez et al. 2012)
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Appendix B: Theoretical Framework 
Table B2. 
Theoretical Framework 
Factors Concept 
Dimension of 
corporate 
governance of 
ownership 
 
 
 
 
 
Dimension of 
corporate 
governance of the 
Board 
 
 
 
 
Dimension of 
corporate 
governance of 
management 
 
Dimension of 
corporate 
governance of 
control 
It is the highest level of decision making in a company. There, the 
shareholders receive information and exercise actions on statutes, 
investments, divestitures, dividends, debt, board of directors, audit, 
fees, corporate governance guidelines in general terms and other 
mechanisms to control, understand and evaluate their assets. The 
governing bodies of this dimension are the General Assembly of 
Shareholders, Owners´ Council and Committees of the assembly. 
 
It is elected by the shareholders' meeting and is responsible for 
overseeing the interests of shareholders, designing the corporate 
strategy and guiding senior management to ensure the fulfillment of 
short and long term objectives. The profile of its members is high 
and its decisions are characterized by independence. The Board may 
rely on committees for strategy, nomination, remuneration, 
evaluation, among others. 
 
Both the General Manager and the executives who make up the top 
management of the company, are responsible for the implementation 
of the strategy, as well as the daily administration of resources and 
law´ compliance. 
 
At this level, the governing bodies are the internal and external 
auditors and their Committees. They are in charge of supervision, 
control, risk analysis, verification of transparency and fluidity of 
information, the independence of corporate governance actors and 
the timely implementation of corrective actions. 
Adapted from “Gobierno Corporativo. Prácticas sugeridas e implementadas por empresas 
familiares y no familiares colombianas” by Gómez-Betancourt, G., Zapata-Cuervo, N., and 
Betancourt-Ramírez, J. B., 2016, Entramado, 12(2), pp. 12-29. 
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Appendix C: Informed Consent Format for Experts 
 
Bogotá, Mayo de 2017 
Dr.______. 
Ciudad 
 
Asunto: Elección de prácticas de gobierno corporativo de la propiedad, para tesis doctoral 
 
Estimado Dr. ________, reciba un cordial saludo. 
Por medio de la presente me permito expresarle mi saludo y agradecimiento por su 
participación en la entrevista que pretende seleccionar las prácticas de gobierno 
corporativo del Código País, que están directamente influenciadas por el nivel de la 
propiedad empresarial, es decir, aquellas inherentes a los accionistas. 
Lo anterior se hace con el fin de determinar la existencia de una influencia directa 
de las prácticas de gobierno de la propiedad en el desempeño de las empresas que cotizan 
en la bolsa de valores. 
Los resultados de las entrevistas aplicadas a expertos en el área de gobierno 
corporativo de la empresa familiar, harán parte de la investigación que realizo para optar el 
grado de Doctor in Strategic Business Administration – DBA otorgado por CENTRUM 
Graduate Business Shool de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú en doble titulación 
con Maastricht School of Management, con la tesis titulada «Ownership Governance 
Practices and their Influence on Family Businesses Financial Performance». 
El tiempo de duración aproximada de la entrevista es de 30 minutos. Los datos 
generales de la entrevista serán publicados, junto con su nombre. Al contestar la entrevista, 
manifestará su consentimiento de participar en la investigación. 
47 
Estaré atento a su respuesta para coordinar fecha y hora para realizar la entrevista 
vía presencial o virtual. Si tiene alguna inquietud con gusto la atenderé vía telefónica o por 
e-mail, datos que aparecen junto a mi firma de correo electrónico. 
De antemano agradezco su colaboración.  
Cordialmente, 
 
Jose Betancourt 
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Appendix D: Interview Format 
Table D3.  
Format of Interview with Experts 
Expert interview notes 
Date                       Place                       
Start Time   End time   
Name   
Credentials   
Institutional affiliation   
Phone   Skype   
e-mail   
Main subjects discussed 
  
  
  
  
Expert Signature  
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Appendix E: Style Review Statement 
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Chapter IV. Results 
Introducción 
As mentioned earlier, this doctoral thesis is made up of six parts: (a) the Abstract 
and Resumen Ejecutivo; (b) the Table of Contents; (c) the Research Proposal (RP), which 
was defended earlier; (d) the Results, made up of the accepted or published research paper 
presenting the doctoral research results; (e) the Conclusions and Recommendations; and (f) 
the Appendices. The abstract presents the research purpose, the research method, and the 
main finding in a maximum of 250 words: the new doctoral contribution to management 
science.  
Chapter IV the thesis contains an identical copy of the accepted or published 
research paper. The requirement by CENTRUM PUCP is that the research paper should be 
accepted or published in a Q1 to Q3 Scopus journal before the doctoral student can defend 
his/her thesis. The authorship of the paper should show the student´s name as the first 
author. Then other name(s) can also appear, must notably the name of the thesis advisor, 
and a co advisor. The paper must be published in English. 
As stated earlier, this paper, as it should be, includes all the details that appear in 
the journal where it will be published o where it has been published: article title, author(s) 
name(s), abstract, keywords, paper contents, including the results, where the doctoral 
contribution to the management science should be included. It also includes the 
Conclusions, and the list of References. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Ownership is usually a system assumed implicit in the dynamics of management of enterprises, but it actually deserves 
more attention than a periodic control in the yearly general shareholder’s assembly. Empowerment of owners is required 
given the magnitude of decisions they make in terms of capital and business purpose, and not just delegate it to the 
Board or the CEO. Despite the relevance of the topic, there is a gap in the literature of corporate governance in family 
business from the ownership dimension. This longitudinal study uses a quantitative approach with an explanatory scope 
that pretends to answer the question: Do shareholders corporate governance practices and family control influence 
financial performance on businesses? 104 public companies were analyzed and 36.5% of them were identified as 
family businesses, using data from National Registry of Values and Issuers, which also responded the country Code 
survey of Colombia in the period 2008-2014. Data was processed with student’s t test and Random Effects analysis that is 
a panel data technique. Results shown that family and non-family businesses have significant differences in ownership 
governance practices, but no significant relationship were identified between corporate governance practices of 
shareholders or family control with financial performance. 
 
Keywords: Shareholders, Ownership, Corporate Governance, Practices, Family Business, Financial Performance 
JEL Classifications: G30, G34, L25 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Family businesses around the world are a large and 
important component of the economy, though often 
are associated with SMEs, they come to represent in 
many countries between 70% and 95% of all 
companies, which represent a similar contribution to 
the global GDP and between 50% and 80% of all jobs 
(European Family Businesses, 2012). 
 
Their particular behavior has led many authors to 
study family businesses in order to identify what 
makes them different. Some studies indicate that one 
of the aspects that can influence the performance of 
these companies is the corporate governance applied 
by the owner family (Chrisman et al., 2013). 
 
 
A standard definition of corporate governance 
includes shareholders and refers to the defense of their 
interests (Tirole, 2001), in this way it addresses the 
problem of agency separation from ownership and 
control that affects all companies (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
According to Brenes et al. (2011) corporate 
governance can provide multiple benefits such as 
transparency, accountability and control, as well as 
having the potential to influence economic 
performance and generate positive impact on effective 
communication and family harmony. 
 
This study focuses on corporate governance practices 
at the ownership level, because the owners are the 
final decision-making body of enterprises through the 
general shareholder’s assembly. One of the reasons 
that led to this study is that ownership is always 
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analyzed jointly with Board of Directors and Management, as if the 
owners themselves do not have the ability to influence companies. This 
study seeks to highlight the role of the ownership. 
 
1.1. Background of the Problem 
Over 30 years ago ownership system was incorporated into the 
study of family businesses (Tagiuri and Davis, 1996), but it has 
been virtually ignored by scholars of the area (Sharma, 2004), 
even though the ownership is one of the domains with greater 
relevance because there, resources that give rise and support 
organizations are concentrated, and is the instance for the most 
important decisions in terms of capital. 
 
Just few authors (Aronoff and Ward, 2002a; Betancourt et al., 
2011; Gómez-Betancourt, 2010; Jaffe and Lane, 2004) have 
highlighted the importance of knowing more about the ownership, 
its governance frameworks and strategies. Ownership is usually a 
system assumed implicit in the dynamics of management of 
enterprises, but it actually deserves more attention than a simple 
periodic control in the yearly General Shareholder´s Assembly. 
A family business that recognizes the ownership as an important 
issue, brings together shareholders to work on a common vision, 
develops a strategy to boost growth, agreed risk levels, generates 
liquidity and promotes profitability, while foreseeing contingencies 
and shielding against them through legal structures and consensual 
policies. 
 
Countries around the world have been inspired by the Anglo- 
American and the Continental European corporate governance 
models in order to minimize agency problems (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003), but in general the implementation of good 
corporate governance practices in family businesses is difficult, 
because their benefits are unclear. Good governance practices are 
seen as inspired by large corporations that are poorly linked to the 
business reality of the majority, i.e. micro, small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) where intuition reigns over professionalization. 
For this reason, it is not easy for many to link corporate governance 
with economic performance of companies, although important 
research such as that made by Klapper and Love (2004) or 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) have shown it. 
 
The economic crisis and financial frauds in recent decades have 
highlighted the poor quality and in many cases absence of good 
corporate governance practices, which has given rise to worldwide 
research to understand the problematic, but also the benefits 
derived from them. Multiple empirical studies have endeavored 
to demonstrate the relationship between the implementation of 
practices and economic performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Block et al., 2011; Brenes et al., 2011; Lagos et al., 2018; San 
Martin-Reyna and Duran-Encalada, 2012). The problem with 
these researches is that it has analyzed totally different roles and 
interests jointly, such as owners, boards of directors, management 
and auditors. This mixture can blur the role played by some of them 
and lead to erroneous conclusions. The owners are responsible 
for making the most impactful decisions for a company in terms 
of capital and organizational purpose, which is why its ability 
to influence business performance is superior to the board of 
directors. The main problem that arises in Latin America is that 
the owners do not assume their role and fully delegate their power 
to figures such as the board, the CEO or the founder. 
 
Colombia has also been a source of corporate governance studies, 
for example Gonzalez et al. (2012) studied their relationship with 
ownership structures; Pombo and Gutierrez (2011) analyzed the 
influence of outside directors on corporate boards; Gómez- 
Betancourt et al. (2012) discussed the relationship between 
ownership structure, practices and economic performance. But 
again, all research focused on the Board or in a mix of roles of 
ownership, governance and management, relegating the role of 
owners to background. 
 
Research in Colombia has identified that 74% of the shares of 
companies belong to one or two families (Pombo and Gutiérrez, 
2011). Considering that family businesses represent the largest 
percentage of organizations in the national economy and also 
have particular dynamics that allow them to work together more 
frequently at the level of ownership, it is necessary to developed 
studies targeting this type of companies. 
 
1.2. Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative, longitudinal research is to 
determine the influence of ownership governance practices on 
the financial performance of Colombian family businesses, 
because the correct exercise of the role of owners in companies 
can decentralize power, maximize control and make corporate 
governance processes more efficient. The study analyze data 
from financial information reported by issuers of the National 
Registry of Values and Issuers (NRVI), it also uses dichotomous 
data on the implementation of corporate governance practices of 
companies which filled the corporate governance survey Country 
Code of Colombia for the period 2008-2014, and classify the 
cases for family businesses or non-family businesses. Practices 
were analyzed with three recognized national experts on corporate 
governance and family business with the aim to select the corporate 
governance practices directly linked with the ownership level. All 
resultant variables were processed statistically with Radom Effects 
model (RE). This research method is appropriate since this study 
is intended to make statistical generalizations. 
 
The methodology is appropriate for the proposed research because 
this study pretend to show a relationship between exogenous and 
endogenous variables, also generating prescriptive results that 
provide estimates of the potential impact of ownership 
corporate governance practices under the assumption that the 
family businesses´ owners follows the strategy to improve specific 
financial indicators. This study is relevant because it focuses on 
the study of corporate governance practices at the ownership level 
and its relationship to economic performance, and the research 
hypotheses accepted encourages business owners to work on their 
implementation. 
 
1.3. Significance of the Problem 
The field of study of the family business has evolved considerably 
since its inception three decades ago. Input from multiple 
authors has contributed to the understanding of its essence, the 
interpretation of its dynamics and the discovery of its distinctive 
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capabilities against other companies (Habbershon and Williams, 
1999). After a research review in the area of family businesses 
on corporate governance and its relationship with performance, 
it can be observed that researchers explore the board and the 
management as exogenous variables, but apply in a very limited 
way family equity participation as a moderator variable. Scholars 
like Brenes et al. (2011) have analyzed the impact on family 
business performance of governance structures at the board 
of directors level, Pombo and Gutiérrez (2011) find a relation 
of external directors and board interlocks with family firm 
performance, Gonzalez et al. (2012) identify the relation between 
family firms and better financial performance and growth respect 
variables as the management involvement of the founder, or the 
ownership control of family business groups, also authors like 
Kowalewski et al., (2010) identified in Polish family firms a 
relationship between performance and variables like the share 
of family ownership, the family CEOs, or Sciascia and Mazzola 
(2008) that found non-linear effects on performance of family 
involvement in ownership and management. 
 
This research will contribute to explain the influence of ownership 
governance practices on the performance of family business, 
in order to promote the implementation of the most relevant 
practices and prioritize efforts of family businesses, because 
shareholders and managers do not give the relevance that corporate 
governance practices deserve, and it is probably because they are 
not implemented at all levels of power of the company, such as 
ownership, which is where they take place the economic and 
strategic decisions of greater dimensions. According to Danies 
(2006) in Colombia 69.5% of companies are family businesses, 
but participation varies according to company size, in small ones 
it is 77.4%, in medium ones it is 67.3%, in microenterprises it 
is 73.1% and in large family businesses it is 46.8%. Based on 
the aforementioned, it is undeniable that family businesses play 
an important role in the national economy. Researchers have 
suggested governance practices and policies can create suitable 
conditions to face difficulties that afflict these businesses (Botero 
et al., 2015; Mustakallio et al., 2002; Suess, 2014). Therefore, this 
research aims to provide incentives for families in businesses to 
implement best practices in their organizations, in first instance 
with an economic approach, but in the long term, thinking about 
the continuity of the company. 
 
1.4. Nature of the Study 
This longitudinal study used a quantitative approach with a non- 
experimental design and an explanatory scope. The population 
was composed by companies listed on the NRVI of Colombia 
during a 7 years period, the sample was selected on a non-random 
basis and analyzed with random effects (RE) model, assuming 
that the variance of the errors is homoscedastic, the explanatory 
variables were orthogonal to the residuals, that is, they do not 
share information, and that the errors are not correlated with each 
other. Also using an adequate size of the sample, that according 
with Green (1991) should be more than 50 + 8 (per variable) for 
testing an overall model. 
 
The population, constituted by Colombian publicly offered 
companies, were classified in family business, when three families 
or less have at least 50% of voting rights a non-family business 
if proven otherwise. Practices promoted by the Country Code 
(Código País in Spanish) were analyzed with a panel of experts in 
order to identify those that are related with ownership governance, 
and those that have a greater impact on firm performance. 
 
This research pretends to identify the relation and influence of 
corporate governance practices at the level of owners and the 
financial performance in family firms, for this reason the research 
question is: To what extent do ownership governance practices 
influence financial performance on family businesses? 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This explanatory study aims to explain the influence of ownership 
governance practices on the performance of family businesses, 
in terms of profitability of assets and equity, because these ratios 
reflect the good or bad functioning of the company without going 
into detail on efficiency in the use of capital or debt as would 
other financial ratios. This is especially important in the study of 
family businesses that are characterized by the use of differential 
strategies to manage their finances (Gomez-Betancourt et al., 
2012), for multiple reasons such as control, familiar, expropriation 
of rights (Crisostomo and de Freitas Brandão, 2019), taxation, 
book keeping, these owners can influence the general indicators 
of economic performance to favor particular interests, so it is 
necessary to focus on indicators widely used in the area. The 
combination of Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory allows 
arguing that the principal aim is to maximize benefits and align 
interests with the agent to minimize problems and risks. 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency Theory is 
useful to analyze this cause-effect relationship, because in an 
agency relationship, the principal seeks to maximize its benefits, 
and for that reason hires the agent is to work on its behalf. 
With autonomous management allowing maximizing profits, 
the problem is that the objectives of the principal and the agent 
are not always aligned. On the other hand, there are inherent 
characteristics to the family business’ nature that were explained 
through Stewardship Theory, for example topics related with non- 
financial goals (Westhead and Howorth, 2006), deep emotional 
investment in the family (Bubolz, 2001), shareholder’s personal 
satisfaction (motivation), socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2010) and reputation (Ward, 2004). 
 
It is relevant to study family businesses due to its predominance 
in economies (Holderness, 2009) and its contribution to the 
generation of employment and of wealth of countries (Shanker 
and Astrachan, 1996). 
 
2.1. Definition of Terms 
This study takes three definitions into account. At first, corporate 
governance is a group of mechanisms and practices through which 
interested parties control and protect information and corporate 
management (John and Senbet, 1998), and in this study is meant 
by Governance Practices Ownership all mechanisms available to 
shareholders to make decisions, control, understand and evaluate 
their assets (Gomez-Betancourt et al., 2016). Based on Villalonga 
Ramirez, et al.: Ownership Governance Practices and their Influence on Family Businesses Financial Performance 
110 International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues | Vol 10 • Issue 2 • 2020 
 
 
 
 
and Amit (2006), this study defined the Family Business as the 
company where three families or less have at least 50% of voting 
rights. 
 
Finally, financial performance in family business is studied 
mainly through the ROA (Klapper and Love, 2004), ROE (Brown 
and Caylor, 2009), debt (Gallo et al., 2000) and sales growth 
(Gomez-Betancourt et al., 2012), but this study will be focused 
on the Return on Assets (ROA) (see, e.g. Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Gonzalez et al., 2012), and Return on Equity (ROE) (see, 
e.g. Brown and Caylor, 2009). These financial indicators will 
make possible to identify the final result of the firm and compare 
the results with previous international studies. 
 
2.2. Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations 
This study was designed based on two assumptions, first that the 
theories of agency and stewardship reflect the phenomenon to be 
studied in Colombia, furthermore it is assumed that Colombian 
family businesses are managed in a similar way as in developed 
countries, where other studies have been developed. 
 
One limitation of the study is that the responses of the companies 
in the Country Code survey are not completely sincere, this may 
be due to the need to report appropriate information to the control 
entity that applied the survey or because they seek to promote a 
message of confidence to the investor market. Another limitation 
of the study is that in the world there is great diversity of research 
with performance definitions, in this research a generally accepted 
measurement was used, but it is likely that under specific market 
conditions of a country, this measurement should be adjusted. 
 
This research study ownership corporate governance practices 
included in the Country Code. The companies listed in the NRVI 
are the largest economic organizations in the country and it is 
supposed that they have the best governance practices to ensure 
transparency and investor’s confidence. This study is delimited to: 
(a) companies with high levels of formality rather than micro and 
SME; (b) companies that belong to the Colombian capital market; 
(c) companies with a similar cultural background as Latin America; 
and (d) companies with family control as common denominator. 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
The present research aims to explain the influence of ownership 
governance practices on financial performance of family 
businesses, in order to promote the implementation of the most 
relevant practices and prioritize efforts of family businesses. 
Despite the great effort to minimize agency problems in multiple 
countries through codes of corporate governance (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003) and the large number of studies on corporate 
governance in family businesses developed in Latin America, 
Spain and Portugal focused on understanding structures and 
processes of corporate governance (Lagos and Botero, 2016), 
there is still a gap in the literature on corporate governance at the 
ownership level and its relation to financial performance. Although it 
is worth noting that recognized studies analyze corporate 
governance and its performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Brown 
and Caylor, 2009; Gomez-Betancourt et al., 2012; Gonzalez et al., 
2012; Klapper and Love, 2004), they do so by concentrating on 
Boards of Directors and Management, which is why, on another 
perspective, this study highlights the role of owners in decision 
making and company control. 
 
The structure of the literature review was designed to facilitate 
the implementation of the research and fulfilling its objectives. 
The literature review presents an introduction with tendencies of 
research in the field of family business and corporate governance, 
then referring to the three major components of this study, the first 
part discusses corporate governance practices in family businesses, 
the second part describes ownership in family businesses and the 
third part presents the issue of performance in family businesses. 
In order to analyze the main concepts concerning this research, 
the following literature analysis is to be developed in this section, 
Appendix A presents a literature map that concentrates the main 
aspects in the thematic as well as the relations between the main 
concepts, and the Appendix B presents the theoretical framework 
which supports the analysis of corporate governance practices in 
a fragmented way, specifically at the ownership level. 
 
3.1. Literature Review 
Kumar and Zattoni (2016) analyzed the attention that captures in 
the academic community the issue of family businesses, which is 
not surprising considering that (Zattoni and Judge, 2012) control 
of ownership by the families not only apply to SMES, but also to 
large companies traded on the stock exchange. In a Special Issue 
on family governance Memili et al. (2016) emphasized that family 
businesses are a key component in global economies, but due to 
lack of knowledge about them in terms of corporate governance 
is still needed more research in this line, because the multiple 
configurations that can be implemented generate different types of 
impact on their behavior, results and strategies. Memili et al. (2016) 
especially highlighted the possibility of obtaining different results 
in the studies, when applied in different countries and cultures. 
This has been evident in the existing literature where have been 
found positive and negative effects of family ownership on the 
strategies and performance of this type of companies (Kumar and 
Zattoni, 2016). 
 
Some characteristics of family firms allow them to act differently 
compared to their competitors in the same industry (Miller et al., 
2012). Despite the dichotomy present in the literature, some 
authors have identified that the empirical evidence supports a 
greater positive impact of family control (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2011). In the literature, it is increasingly common to study the effect 
of corporate governance on family firms in both quantitative and 
non-economic aspects. For example, Suyono (2016) recently study 
the influence of family-controlled firm and corporate governance 
mechanisms on corporate performance founding a positive relation 
with corporate performance seen as Tobin´s Q and ROA, even 
though the relationship with the variables of governance was not 
confirmed. Of course, some articles analyze corporate governance 
from the role of the board, its configuration and its ability to 
implement norms and skills to influence business performance or 
their behavior (Bauweraerts and Colot, 2017; Zattoni et al., 2015). 
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Others also noted the existence of non-economic goals derived 
from the control that the owning family drives the company 
through the governing bodies (Chrisman et al., 2014). According 
to scholars (Madison et al., 2016), research on governance and 
performance issues should be addressed with the Agency and 
stewardship theories, which, despite appearing to be contrary at 
first sight, explain the phenomenon of corporate governance in 
predicting results, reason why this study will use both optics to 
analyze the phenomenon of interest. The following is a literature 
review that is limited to the research model that has been concretely 
presented in Appendix A. 
 
3.2. Research Model 
As evidenced previously, research on corporate governance in the 
family business defines the concept of ownership as a central axis, 
because it is the most visible way to identify family businesses 
in data analysis with large volume. The role of ownership in 
family businesses is much deeper than that, but in this area of 
research, academics have simply used it as a definition or control 
variable, not taking into account that it is a system that needs to 
be managed (Betancourt et al., 2011). The authors of the F-PEC 
scale (Astrachan et al., 2002) pointed out in their article the need 
for a widely-accepted definition of family business, although 
they endeavored to propose a measure of family influence in 
business through power, experience and culture. The possibility 
of having an agreement among academics on a single definition 
is still far off. Some authors (Lopez-Gracia and Sanchez-Andujar, 
2007) used this scale to analyze the financial structure of family 
businesses and performance, their results not showed significant 
differences for most measures of financial performance, probably 
by limiting the analysis to a single family, when several families 
can influence in organizational culture. Although other authors 
have identified behaviors such as those of single-family companies 
in companies belonging to three controlling families (three or less 
families’ shareholding above 50%) (Gomez et al., 2012), it is still 
more accepted to consider as family businesses those with single 
family ownership, where a family shareholder group has the highest 
proportion of voting rights (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
 
The next axis is corporate governance that can be influenced by 
the family. Lagos and Botero (2016) indicated that in this type of 
companies’ corporate governance can be developed for family, 
business and patrimonial systems. Corporate governance should be 
understood as the group of mechanisms with which stakeholders 
exert control over information and management (John and Senbet, 
1998). For example, in the family system owner families can 
have a family council, which will concentrate the structures and 
procedures to help the family organize and manage the family- 
business relationship (Berent-Braun and Uhlaner, 2012). In the 
business system, the Board of Directors is the decision-making 
body that directs to achieve the objectives (Gersick and Feliu, 
2014), and design the strategy, along with help of top managers 
who are responsible for day-to-day management and strategy 
implementation (Gomez et al., 2016). Finally, in the ownership 
system, which is the sphere of competence of this research, there 
are two decision-making spaces, on the one hand a Shareholder´s 
Assembly exercises control and decision making to influence the 
macro strategy of the company, and on the other, an Owner´s 
Council helps owners with the periodic development of topics of 
interest to family owners, like accounting, legal, diversification, 
synergies, risks and return parameters (Gomez et al., 2016). 
 
The final axis, which can be influenced by the other two, is 
performance, understood as the measurement of results, that can 
be qualitative based on perceptions or quantitative. Several studies 
address performance from different perspectives. Some authors 
analyze the long term as the family-influenced on firms whose 
performance goal is transgenerational wealth, wealth growth 
and rent generation potential (Habbershon et al., 2003), others 
studied firm performance as the perception of conflict, satisfaction, 
commitment, harmony (Beehr et al., 1997) or the impact on 
agency costs (Dyer, 2006). Scholars have also studied it from 
efficiency, by analyzing the capital structure of firms controlled 
by an owner family that are more efficient, have great value and 
less debt (McConaughy et al., 2001). Recent studies explored the 
entrepreneurial orientation and the relation between risk taking 
and performance (Naldi et al., 2007). Finally it has been a constant 
the creation of studies that seek to understand the relations of 
variables on measures of financial performance as Tobins´Q 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003), ROE (Brown and Caylor, 2009), 
ROA (Klapper and Love, 2004), Sales growth (Chrisman et al., 
2004; Gomez-Betancourt et al., 2012), Size, Margins (Daily and 
Dollinger, 1992), Debt (Gallo et al., 2000), among others. A more 
detailed literature review of each of these axes is presented below. 
 
3.3. Corporate Governance Practices in Family 
Businesses 
Corporate governance is a concept that has been gaining importance 
in the academic and business environment due to ethical problems 
that have led to financial crises with global impact. The traditional 
concept of corporate governance refers to safeguarding the 
interests of the owners to minimize agency problems (Tirole, 
2001). According to John and Senbet (1998) corporate governance 
is a group of mechanisms by which stakeholders exert control 
over information and executive management of the company. 
The great contribution made by the corporate governance for 
shareholders and bondholders, is to serve as a reliable instrument 
to support investments in companies where managers seek to 
reduce the risk (La Porta et al., 2000a). This research analyzes 
corporate governance in a practical way, using practices to dilute 
the power in decision-making through the separating of ownership 
and management control (Gillan, 2006). 
 
Corporate governance practices should be understood in this 
study as all initiatives that seek to structure the decision-making 
and control of the ownership and management. Those practices 
can come from two sources, hard law that forces companies to 
comply with certain requirements and soft law which are initiatives 
of private and multilateral institutions that invite organizations to 
implement agreements that are more demanding than the laws of a 
country (Gomez-Betancourt and Zapata, 2013). 
 
In some circumstances, family businesses implement governance 
practices (e.g. dividends) to build trust in the market, to align with 
the interests of investors (Pindado et al., 2012) and to avoid 
depriving minority shareholders of rights (La Porta et al., 2000b). 
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Due to the above it becomes important to analyze governance 
practices in family businesses. 
 
3.4. Ownership in Family Business 
Family businesses ownership is a bridge between the family and 
the business (Distelberg and Sorenson, 2009), with goals, culture 
and family values transmitted through governance bodies (Aronoff 
and Ward, 2002b; Habbershon and Astrachan, 1997; Tower et al., 
2007) to intricate systems that involve people, resources, interests 
and feelings, reason why it is necessary to use a clear structure to 
control and manage investments (Jaffe and Lane, 2004). 
 
In this document ownership is understood as the ability to use and 
control the use of objects (Rudmin and Berry, 1987), but it is 
necessary to clarify that ownership in the family business is not 
only used to pursue economic interests. According to Davis et al. 
(1997) owners link emotional investments to the company (Bubolz, 
2001), reason why they pursue individual objectives as personal 
satisfaction and professional achievement, or transcendent goals 
as reputation, legacy or social capital (Ward, 2004). 
 
Some scholars (De Jong et al., 2004) have studied the role played 
by shareholders in the corporate governance of companies 
through the general shareholder’s assembly, but although this is 
an important mechanism to enforce their rights, is not the one they 
must concentrate on. Owners should be prepared to have the skills 
required to exercise their role, because this is not something that 
comes naturally (Aronoff and Ward, 2002a). Gomez-Betancourt 
and Zapata (2013) suggest that the General Shareholder ’s 
Assembly takes decisions on the choice of the auditor, the choice 
of the Board of Directors members and their respective allocation 
of fees, as well as decisions relating to investments or divestments 
outside the Board´s scope, allocation of dividends, bylaw reform, 
debt policy, share transaction policy, social responsibility policy, 
among others. 
 
In family businesses, as well as in any other company, there 
are multiple owners’ profiles with diverse interests. Aronoff 
and Ward (2002a) identified a few (e.g. operating, governing, 
involved, passive, investor and proud owner). These profiles help 
to understand the expectations of shareholders, but in most cases, 
they do not have a broad willingness to follow a large number of 
recommendations on governance practices to be implemented, 
which is why this study seeks to identify the practices from the 
corporate governance of ownership that have a greater impact on 
financial performance. 
 
3.5. Financial Performance 
Family members can influence the firm performance through 
expectations shareholders have about the organization. Gomez, 
Lopez and Betancourt (2009) found a positive relationship between 
ownership, family vision and sales growth in family SMES. 
 
Research about family businesses and performance has applied 
multiple indicators to measure as dependent variables. One of the 
most used and reliable measures is sales growth (Murphy et al., 
1996; Dess and Robinson, 1984), because it reveals behavior of 
firms over time without accounting changes that businessmen 
tend to apply to reduce taxes. Others are more inclined to apply 
multiple measures such as Buchanan et al. (2010) who analyzed 
the profitability, dividend payments, level of indebtedness and 
price of the shares, regarding decisions taken by the General 
Shareholder’s Assembly. 
 
Multiple authors (Prevost and Rao, 2000; Wahal, 1996) have 
studied the actions taken by the General Shareholder’s Assembly 
concerning the value of the firm, focusing on short-term behavior 
of the stock market and profitability of the firm in the long 
term. In mature markets usually business performance has been 
studied through Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation 
and Amortization (EBITDA). Some authors have analyzed the 
operating performance of the firms taking the EBITDA divided by 
assets (Kowalewski et al., 2010). Other studies use performance 
indicators such as the ROE (Brown and Caylor, 2009), debt 
(Gallo et al., 2000) and sales growth (Gomez-Betancourt et al., 
2012). ROA is another indicator used in emerging markets on 
imperfect capital markets with usually high level of debt (Chang 
and Choi, 1988). Recognized authors (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) 
used Tobin’s Q as a market-based measure, but in the case of 
Colombian market is not possible to use it because the number of 
stocks of the equity issuers with market liquidity is small (<20%) 
(Gonzalez et al., 2012). 
 
There are many authors who have addressed the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance, but it 
is important to note that not all indicators are useful for observing 
the effects that can be generated by shareholders, the Board, 
committees or management in business results. For example, 
studies on Board committees (Lam and Lee, 2012) used measures 
such as ROA, ROE Return on Capital Employed (ROCE), and the 
market-to-book value of equity (MTBV). In this study, MTBV ratio 
could not be used because it seeks to measure the capacity to 
generate money from the available capital, which is responsibility 
of management or Board level. Other authors who have analyzed 
the relationship of CEO succession to performance (Bennedsen 
et al., 2007) have observed more operational measures such as the 
Operating ROA (OROA) or the ratio of earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT). Also, from another perspective, some authors 
(Coles et al., 2001) have studied different facets of corporate 
governance with Economic Value Added (EVA), without finding 
significant relationships. 
 
Taking into account the above, this study will use two indicators, 
the ROE (Brown and Caylor, 2009), the ROA (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008) 
and the ROCE (Lam and Lee, 2012) which have been used by the 
most representative studies in the area of family business that 
relate financial performance and the influence of the owner-family, 
therefore the results of this research can be compared with them. 
 
3.6. Hypotheses 
After a research review of family business literature on corporate 
governance and its relationship with financial performance 
it can be observed that researchers explore the board and the 
management as exogenous variables, but apply in a very limited 
way the family equity participation as moderator variable. 
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Scholars like Brenes et al. (2011) have analyzed the impact of 
governance structures at the level of board of directors on family 
business performance. They identified that more formal boards 
of directors provide better non-financial benefits, some of these 
aspects are business knowledge, active participation, support in 
business management and family-business conflict resolution. 
Pombo and Gutierrez (2011) studied the characteristics of the 
Board and its relation with ROE and ROA. They find a relation 
of external directors and board interlocks with family businesses 
performance in terms of econometric results, where external 
directors, in particular the busy ones, have a positive influence 
on ROA. Additionally, they found the positive influence of 
ownership control of the families that will be included in the 
present document’s model. 
 
Sciascia and Mazzola (2008) studied a SMEs sample but did not 
find a significant relationship between family involvement and 
performance. Its main contribution was to identify that non- 
listed companies have different behavior from public offered 
companies have been characterized as presenting positive 
relations between their ownership and governance characteristics 
with financial performance. Additionally, in SMES they found a 
negative quadratic relation that indicates that at a certain point 
the influence of the family begins to be a disadvantage for the 
organization. 
 
Gonzalez et al. (2012) identify with a regression analysis the 
relation between family firms and its better financial performance i 
n  te rm s  of  ROA respec t  vari abl es  a s  t he m ana gem ent 
involvement of the founder, or the ownership control of family 
business groups. They found that the direct or indirect control of 
dominant family ownership groups influences positively, with a 
decreasing effect relative to a greater size of the company. 
Authors like Kowalewski et al. (2010) identified in Polish 
family companies that an inverted U-shape relationship between 
family involvement in ownership and management with financial 
performance exists. Those authors found that a moderate family 
influence improves the financial performance from the point of 
view of the stakeholders. 
 
Following these findings, this study expects a positive effect on the 
financial performance of companies owned by a family shareholder 
groups, and with more practices of corporate governance at the 
ownership level. The preceding arguments lead to the following 
hypotheses: 
H :Family and non-family businesses have different ownership 
like Aronoff and Ward (2002a) have described the variety of 
profiles and interests that exist inside those stigmatized groups. 
Some experts (Lagos and Botero, 2016) have identified that large 
part of literature on corporate governance of family businesses 
in Latin America, Spain and Portugal largely focus on Boards 
of Directors. Nor should it be forgotten that one of the biggest 
problems found in family businesses in developing countries 
is that the owners do not fully exercise their rights and duties, 
either because there is a culture that does not protect minority 
shareholders, or because due to lack of knowledge and skills, they 
prefer to delegate to the board of directors or even to management a 
large part of their functions. Because of the above it is highly 
relevant to understand the role of the owners through governance 
bodies and best corporate governance practices that could exercise 
influence on economic performance, as demonstrated by other 
studies that analyzed ownership in conjunction with board of 
directors and management of the firm. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
Taking into account the gap of the literature on corporate 
governance from the ownership level in family businesses, the 
main objective of this research aims to explain the influence of 
ownership governance practices on their financial performance. 
This section describes the design, the process, the sample 
characteristics, the validity and reliability that were outlined in 
this study. 
 
In general terms, the approach of this research was quantitative; 
the study takes numerical data from financial information reported 
by issuers of NRVI, and also discuss dichotomous data on the 
implementation of corporate governance practices assessed by the 
Country Code. Data was analyzed statistically with RE model. 
 
The research scope was explanatory and aims to establish the 
relationship between the ownership governance practices and 
the financial performance on family businesses registered in the 
NRVI. Additionally, the inherent ownership governance practices 
that generate greater impact on performance were identified to 
promoted them among the shareholders and thus produce greater 
practical impact on the business community. 
 
4.1. Research Design 
The research design is quantitative and non-experimental because 
there is no manipulation of variables. Information was collected 
from secondary sources such as the NRVI and the Country 
governance practices. 
H :To higher ownership corporate governance practices, the higher the 
financial performance (ROA, ROE) of Colombian business. 
H :To higher family control, the higher the financial performance  
of Colombian businesses. 
3.7. Conclusions of the Literature Review 
This review of literature shows that corporate governance is 
becoming increasingly relevant because it allows owners to 
exercise their right of decision-making and control the board and 
management. Nevertheless, literature has assumed that owners 
play a passive role in front of their companies, although authors 
Code, both taken from public databases. In addition, the research 
examines the information during the period 2008-2014, which 
represents a longitudinal study. 
 
4.2. Appropriateness of Design 
The purpose of this quantitative longitudinal research is to 
determine the influence of ownership governance practices on 
the financial performance of Colombian family businesses. In this 
research, panel data techniques of analysis were used. The OLS 
method is not adequate because it raises several assumptions, 
where two of them are not met in the sample, such as Normality 
and Heteroscedasticity; the Fixed Effects (FE) model’s technique 
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includes only e-ects of a variable that is stable over time; Based 
on the above, the RE model was chosen that is superior compared 
to FE (Beck, 2007; Bell and Jones, 2015). The residuals in the RE 
model are calculated at each level, considers the correlated errors 
among the observations and produces consistent standard errors. 
 
The study fulfils the main assumption of RE model that the 
individual specific effects are uncorrelated with the independent 
variables. Data was composed by continuous and dichotomous 
variables, a sample selected on a non-random basis, checking 
aspects as e exogeneity of covariates and the Normality of residuals 
(Bell and Jones, 2015). Also, the study uses an adequate size of 
sample, that according with Green (1991) should be 50 + 8 (per 
variable) for testing an overall model. 
 
4.3. Research Question 
Under a positivist epistemological standpoint this quantitative and 
longitudinal research aims to determine the relationship between 
ownership governance practices and financial performance of 
Colombian family businesses. One research question is solved 
with this study: 
 
To what extent do ownership governance practices influence 
financial performance on family businesses? 
 
4.4. Population 
The population object of this study are family businesses identified 
in the database of the National Registry of Values and Issuers 
(NRVI) of Colombia during the years 2008-2014, which have also 
filled the Country Code survey on governance practices. The 
origin of both sources of information is public and official. The 
NRVI aims to inscribe and certify classes of securities, types of 
securities and their issuers must also register emissions carried out 
by them. The registration is a requirement for all entities that want 
to make a public offering of its securities or in a trading system. 
 
104 companies were identified. 55 of which were classified as non- 
family-businesses (NFB) and 49 as family-businesses (FB). The 
companies were grouped into six economic sectors, 42 companies 
carried out activities in the financial sector (28 NFB and 14 FB), 
18 in the industrial sector (9 NFB and 9 FB), 11 in the agribusiness 
sector (3 NFB and 8 FB) 12 in the services sector (8 NFB and 4 
FB), 6 in the Construction sector (3 NFB and 3 FB) and 15 in the 
public services sector (all NFB). 
 
4.5. Informed Consent 
Taking into consideration that the data is available to the public 
and was collected by the national control entity called Financial 
Superintendence, informed consent is not required. The NRVI is 
a register that must be fill the public companies by obligation. 
In addition, the information from the Country Code survey is 
answered by the issuers of securities in Colombia as a requirement. 
There are 41 recommended corporate governance practices of 
voluntary adoption. To evaluate their compliance, the Country 
Code survey is composed of 80 questions structured under the 
“comply or explain” principle, where they answer affirmatively if 
they incorporate a practice or if not, they can explain the reasons 
for not doing so. 
On the other hand, the consulted experts, before being interviewed, 
received an informed consent. 
 
4.6. Sampling Frame 
In this research, convenience sampling by clusters was used having 
as sample units FB and NFB. Being a probabilistic sampling, all 
individuals in the sample have the same probability of being chosen 
for the analysis, in this case when they meet the requirements of 
complete information for financial and corporate governance data, 
from the database of NRVI of Colombia during the years 2008- 
2014 and also the Country Code survey of governance practices. 
 
To study the influence of ownership governance practices on 
the financial performance of Colombian’ family business, it 
was necessary to build a database with corporate governance 
information available in the Country Code survey, also financial 
information of public companies, and to elaborated the FB 
classification according to Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Gómez- 
Betancourt et al. (2012), using family control as the criteria to 
identified family businesses as the company where three families 
or less have at least 50% of voting rights. 
 
It is important to clarify that the Country Code survey is applicable 
to all companies that have securities registered in the NRVI; With 
the exception of the national treasure, mutual funds, autonomous 
funds managed by trust companies, and others mentioned in Law 
546 of 1999, territorial entities mentioned in Article 286 of the 
Constitution, multilateral lending agencies, foreign governments, 
foreign government agencies, branches of foreign companies and 
foreign entities (Superintendencia Financiera, 2014). 
 
The Country Code provides 41 recommendations in the following 
aspects of corporate governance: (a) general shareholder ’s 
assembly, (b) board, (c) financial and non-financial disclosure, and 
(d) resolution of disputes. Due to the fact that through Circular 
028 (Superintendencia Financiera, 2014) the Country Code survey 
was updated to global developments in corporate governance, this 
research only analyzes the information until 2014. In the following 
years, the measures were reduced from 41 to 33, but from 80 
questions passed to 148 recommendations, which does not make 
it possible to standardize the information to extend the period of 
analysis. Now measures are grouped as follows: (a) equity rights 
and fairness of shareholders, (b) general assembly of shareholders, 
(c) board of directors, (d) control architecture, and (e) financial 
and not financial information transparency. For purposes of this 
research information of the corporate governance practices asked 
in the previous surveys was used. 
 
4.7. Confidentiality 
The Country Code is diligence under the principle of “comply 
or explain.” The recommendations are adopted voluntarily. 
Likewise, public companies have the obligation to inform the 
market and to send the Country Code annual survey to Financial 
Superintendence. It stresses that the new Country Code indicated 
that companies registered in the NRVI should include a clause 
where its directors and officers are required to comply with the 
recommendations that each company has voluntarily adopted in 
its bylaws (Superintendencia Financiera, 2014). 
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4.8. Geographic Location and Instrumentation 
This study is applied to all entities that have securities registered in 
the NRVI in the Colombian territory. The Financial Superintendence 
annually publishes financial data from the NRVI firms regarding 
the 80 questions related with corporate governance practices of the 
Country Code survey. The country code survey can be found in 
the annexes of External Circular 007 of 2011. 
 
For the purposes of this research, it was used secondary, public and 
official information considered highly reliable, with an instrument 
applied in a constant way during the mentioned years. The 
information reported comes from the control entity for publicly 
traded companies. 
 
4.9. Data Collection 
The research requires to build a database that passed through three 
stages, first of all, the Country Code’s information survey was 
collected, then the financial information of the companies included 
in the sample were found, and finally companies were classified in 
FB when meeting the criteria of Villalonga and Amit (2006) limited 
to a family shareholder group that has the highest proportion of 
voting rights. In Colombia, information of shareholders of public 
companies is available, but information of shareholder companies 
is private for security reasons, but a strategy was used to identify 
common surnames in shareholders, boards of directors and/or 
CEO positions, in other cases public information for companies 
that are recognized as family owned was used. 
 
On the other hand, Country Code information contains a mixture 
of corporate governance practices that must go through a selection 
process. To do this, practices corresponding to the level of 
ownership were extracted and discussed with three recognized 
experts in the field who were interviewed, analyzing the Country 
Code’s 41 practices and interview information were collected. An 
excerpt from the interviews were attached at the end of the 
document comparing the results. Corporate governance practices 
of the ownership that are selected by at least two of the three 
experts were processed statistically with RE model estimates 
allows to make statistical generalizations concerning the objective 
of this research. 
 
4.10. Data Analysis and Variables 
The steps that covered by this research are (a) sieving, which 
involves the application of interviews to three experts on corporate 
governance in FB to identify the corporate governance practices 
of ownership that are contemplated in the Country Code. For this 
purpose the experts previously received via email the Country 
Code Survey requesting them to identify the practices inherent 
to the owners, and in the interview they were asked to support 
their motives for zed classification; (b) the execution in which the 
financial and corporate governance data is prepared, classified 
and statistically analyzed; and (c) the final report writing with the 
findings, suggestions for future research, theoretical and practical 
implications. 
 
To study the relationship between performance and the application 
of ownership corporate governance practices in FB, a RE model 
was used in a balanced panel data. Dummy variables were used 
for each year of the sample (2008-2014) and six economic sectors 
(financial, industrial, agro-industrial, services, construction and 
utilities). 
 
The variables considered in the model are the following: 
 
4.10.1. Dependent variable 
To measure financial performance, two indicators were used: 
(i) ROA, calculated as the quotient between net income and total 
assets ROA (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008); and (ii) ROE, calculated as the 
quotient between net income and equity (Lam and Lee, 2012). 
 
4.10.2. Independent variable 
Two independent variables were considered in this study, FAMILY 
and IOGP. Based on Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Gómez- 
Betancourt et al. (2012), this study uses family control as the 
criteria to identified family businesses as the company where three 
families or less have at least 50% of voting rights. The variable 
FAMILY was used to classify businesses as FB when three families 
or less have at least 50% of voting rights. In an additional exercise, 
the percentage of family ownership was used as a continuous 
variable that represented family control (% FAMILY). On the 
other hand, corporate governance is a group of mechanisms and 
practices through which interested parties control and protect 
information and corporate management (John and Senbet, 1998), 
and in this study is meant by shareholders’ governance practices 
all mechanisms available to owners to make decisions, control, 
understand and evaluate their assets (Gómez-Betancourt et al., 
2016). To measure shareholders’ corporate governance practices 
was applied an index inspired in the Corporate Governance 
Country Code Index (IGCCP in spanish) designed by Lagos 
and Vecino (2014). The IGCCP not used weighting to assess 
compliance of each practice, only apply one (1) when comply or 
zero (0) otherwise. Each survey question is linked to some practice 
of the Country Code, when several questions refer to the same 
extent, the measurement value is distributed in equal percentages, 
according to the number of questions that assessed. In this research 
were selected the practices inherent to ownership and then it was 
designed the index of ownership governance practices (IOGP). 
 
According to Strätling (2003), the functions that shareholders 
should play are mainly keep informed on the financial performance 
of the company, be aware of important management decisions, 
exercise control over the board of directors and executive 
management, discuss past performance and build policies. Based 
on these guidelines were selected seven measures established in 
the Country Code that cover the corporate governance practices 
for owners and composed the IOGP: access to complete and 
timely information in the convening of the assembly (citation M1), 
information on candidates for the Board of Directors, financial 
reports, among other reports (Board selection and financial 
information M2), design an agenda that guarantees shareholders’ 
rights (assembly agenda M4), respond to the concerns and 
comments of the shareholders (shareholders attention M27), 
facilitating the performance of specialized audits (audit M29), 
reveal the rules of conflict resolution (conflict resolution M34) 
and not contracting with the auditors services other than those of 
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audit (tax auditor M38). The IOGP is calculated from zero to seven, 
with seven as the highest score in corporate governance practices 
of ownership. To test whether family and non-family businesses 
had different variances with respect to ownership governance 
practices, student’s t test was used. 
 
4.10.3. Control variables 
Consistent with empirical research on family business, variables 
were included to control the characteristics of enterprises. The 
variable SIZE is firm size and was measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets, which has been used in renowned research 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003) because the natural logarithm reduces 
the scale number without affecting their properties, which for this 
study is very appropriate because of the use of an indicators on 
a scale from zero to 100 and assets equivalent to billions. This 
variable is an approximation of the risk given that this decreases 
as the size of the companies increases (Davis et al., 2000; Fama 
and French, 1992, 1993). 
 
INDEBTEDNESS is calculated as the ratio of total liabilities and 
total assets (Wintoki et al., 2012). SECTOR dummy is a variable 
that rank companies according to economic activity, in this 
case, the defined sectors are: financial, industrial, agribusiness, 
services, construction and public services. Finally, YEAR is a 
dummy variable that identify the year to which the information 
corresponds. In this way, the RE model used was: 
that is provided in the sampling frame that gives context to the 
studied businesses and the descriptive statistics of the sample. The 
characteristics and context mentioned therein may be relevant to 
other FB that share similar aspects. 
 
The document showed a validation strategy support in each step 
of the process to build the database, to identify practices linked 
with ownership level of corporate governance and analyze data in 
a theoretical context that allows drawing conclusions with strong 
arguments based on empirical data. In general terms, this article 
establishes the external validity to do generalizations based on the 
study of representative sample, although in strengths, limitations, 
and future research. 
 
In this document the criteria of experts in Colombian corporate 
governance practices and in family businesses is triangulated 
through interviews, joint analysis of primary and secondary 
information of documents triangulated provides higher levels 
of confidence in the quality of the data and results. In line with 
the proposal of some authors (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2000) to increase the reliability of the study a check of 
the findings is carried out with third parties, which in principle is 
the same experts interviewed. 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
This section presents the results of the analysis of the relationship 
Peformance
 
= α +ꞵ OGP +ꞵ
 
Family +ꞵ Controls + µ (1) 
it i,t 1 i 2 i j i,t i,t of corporate governance and family control with financial 
performance. The analysis was performed using student’s t test 
4.11. Validity and Reliability 
The research presents several methodological aspects that validate 
criteria of validity and reliability as presented below. The first point 
to be mentioned is that this research was concerned with making a 
theoretical contribution (Whetten, 1989) explaining a phenomenon 
of interest that integrates in factors the most relevant corporate 
governance practices of ownership and excludes others that add 
little value but are promoted by the control entities. Regarding 
internal validity, the document reflects how the research process 
and data analysis allowed to advance from a clear research question 
“To what extent do ownership governance practices influence 
financial performance on family businesses?” to conclusions. 
Words used in the question and the conclusions reflect key aspects 
like financial performance, ownership and corporate governance 
practices, showing a knowledge advance in comparison to previous 
literature. Following the internal validity concept of Yin (2003, 
p. 34), the explanatory scope of this research led to establish causal 
relationships between a given condition and the result, with a 
common thread that ensures that what is said to be researched is 
research actually being carried out. 
 
On the other hand, theoretical context was used mentioning cites 
of several scholars, this theoretical framework provides external 
validity to the concept of financial performance and ownership 
corporate governance practices, which throughout the paper and 
especially on the findings were elevated to a general dimension, 
in other words, the general concept of research is applicable to 
other groups or populations with similar characteristics in different 
countries. This point is linked to the inferential external validity 
and regression models with RE. 
 
5.1. Findings 
Table 1 shows the main descriptive statistics (mean and standard 
deviation) for the complete sample and for the NFB and FB groups. 
It was evidenced that there are statistically significant differences in 
performance, corporate governance and size between NFB and FB 
(P < 0.01). The NFB are more profitable when the performance is 
measured with the ROA, in the NFB a ROA of 0.044 was observed, 
while in the FB this was 0.030. However, when the performance is 
measured with the ROE the difference is not significant. Regarding 
corporate governance, the NFB have higher indicators. The IOGP 
measurement in the NFB was 6,298 and in the FB it was 5,829. 
Similarly, it was observed that the NFB are larger compared to the FB, 
14,114 compared to 13,570. Finally, no significant differences were 
found in the INDEBTEDNESS between NFB and FB. Based on these 
results, Hypothesis 1 (H1) was accepted indicating that family and 
non-family businesses have different ownership governance practices. 
 
Table 2 shows the correlations between variables. Although 
significant correlations were observed in different pairs of 
variables, the result of the variance inflation factor (VIF) rules 
out the existence of multicollinearity problems. In no case were 
the VIF values greater than 6. 
 
5.2. Corporate Governance, Family Control and 
Financial Performance 
Table 3 presents the regression results for the model of equation 
(1). Columns (1) and (2) report the effect of corporate governance 
Peformanceit  = ai,t+ꞵ1OGPi+ꞵ2 Familyi+ꞵjControlsit+ µit  (1) 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Full sample NFB FB Comparison of means 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Difference Statístic t 
ROA 0.039 0.066 0.044 0.078 0.030 0.037 0.014*** 3.358 
ROE 0.084 0.131 0.088 0.130 0.076 0.131 0.011 1.162 
IOGP 6.122 1.009 6.298 0.846 5.829 1.179 0.469*** 5.379 
Size 13.911 2.065 14.114 2.044 13.570 2.958 0.543*** 3.456 
Indebtedness 0.453 0.311 0.442 0.303 0.471 0.324 −0.028 −1.187 
*P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. FB are those companies that have 50% or more family owned. The means test is a student’s t test where different variances are assumed. Source: This 
study. ROA: Return on assets, ROE: Return on equity, IOGP: Index of ownership governance practice, NFB: Non-family-businesses, FB: Family-businesses 
 
Table 2: Correlations matrix 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ROA 
ROE 
1.000 
0.740*** 
 
1.000 
    
IOGP 
Family 
0.136*** 
–0.106*** 
0.223*** 
–0.043 
1.000 
–0.225*** 
 
1.000 
  
Size 0.110*** 0.300*** 0.355*** –0.128*** 1.000  
Indebtedness –0.238*** 0.157*** 0.133*** 0.045 0.395*** 1.000 
*P<0.1; **P<0.05;***P<0.01. Source: This study. ROA: Return on assets, ROE: Return on equity, IOGP: Index of ownership governance practice 
 
Table 3: RE model with IOGP, and financial performance with family control as dummy 
Independent variables Dependent variables 
ROE ROA 
(1)    (2)    (3)    (4) IOGP 
  0.011 (1.42)   0.011 (0.81)  0.005 (1.02)    0.006 (0.74) 
Family  0.021 (1.23)   0.011 (0.11)  0.006 (0.57)    0.020 (0.32) 
Family * IOGP      0.002 (0.10)     −0.002 (−0.25) 
Size  0.011* (1.80)  0.011* (1.79)  0.011 (0.37)    0.011 (0.74) 
Indebtedness –0.064 (–1.04)  −0.064 (−1.05) −0.079*** (−3.48) −0.079*** (−3.47) 
Constant –0.098 (−1.12) −0.094 (−0.89)  0.051 (0.97)    0.045 (0.71) 
Sector dummy variables   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes 
Year dummy variables    Yes    Yes   Yes  Yes 
Wald chi test 68.75*** 72.31*** 33.80*** 33.75*** 
R-squared  13.89  13.91  17.18    17.25 
Observations 728 728 728 728 
Number of firms 104 104 104 104 
 
*P< 0.1; **P<0.05;***P<0.01. Source: This study. The t statistic is presented in parentheses. All regressions have been estimated with the RE model and robust errors. The dependent 
variables are ROE (calculated as the quotient between net income and equity) and ROA (calculated as the quotient between net income and assets). IOGP is the summation of the scores 
obtained in each of the corporate governance recommendations of the Country Code related to shareholders. FAMILY is a dummy variable that takes the value of one (1) in companies 
that have 50% or more of family ownership. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. Indebtedness is the ratio of total liabilities and total assets. The SECTOR and YEAR dummy 
variables identify the economic sector and the year of each observation. ROA: Return on assets, ROE: Return on equity, IOGP: Index of ownership governance practice 
 
and family control (expressed as a dummy variable) on financial 
performance (ROE). Meanwhile, columns (3) and (4) show the effect 
on the ROA dependent variable. In the case of ROE when family 
control is approached with a dummy variable (column 1), the RE 
model explains 13.89% of the variation in performance. In this model, 
only the SIZE variable was significant (0.011, P < 10%) to explain the 
variation in performance. The results are similar when the interaction 
between the FAMILY and IOGP variables (Column 2) is introduced. 
 
In the case of ROA when using the dummy FAMILY variable 
(Column 3), the RE model explains 17.18% of the variation in 
performance. In this model, only the INDEBTEDNESS variable 
(−0.079, P < 1%) was significant. The results are similar when the 
interaction between the FAMILY and IOGP variables (Column 4) 
is introduced. These results show that corporate governance and 
family control are not related to financial performance. 
 
Table 4 presents the regression results for the model of equation 
(1). Columns (1) and (2) report the effect of corporate governance 
and family control (expressed as the percentage of ownership 
held by one or up to three families, % FAMILY) on financial 
performance (ROE). On the other hand, columns (3) and (4) 
show the effect on the ROA dependent variable. The results are 
similar to those presented in Table 3. The SIZE variable (0.010, 
P < 10%) is significant to explain the variation of the ROE, while 
the INDEBTEDNESS variable (−0.079, P < 1%) is significant for 
explain the variation of the ROA. When the terms of interaction 
between the% FAMILY and IOGP variables are included, the 
results do not vary. These results show that corporate governance 
and family control are not related to financial performance. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 and 3 are not supported. 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 
This study analyzes whether shareholders, corporate governance 
practices and family control influence the financial performance 
of companies in the Colombian context, where FBs play a very 
Ramirez, et al.: Ownership Governance Practices and their Influence on Family Businesses Financial Performance 
118 International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues | Vol 10 • Issue 2 • 2020 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Random Effects model with IOGP, and financial performance with family control as percentage 
 
Independent variables Dependent variables 
ROE ROA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
IOGP 0.012 (1.56) 0.015 (1.06) 0.005 (1.11) 0.008 (0.97) 
%Family 0.000 (2.07) 0.000 (0.73) 0.000 (1.62) 0.000 (0.92) 
%Family * IOGP    −0.000 (−0.42)     −0.000 (−0.71) 
Size  0.010* (1.76)  0.010* (1.70)  0.001 (0.33)    0.001 (0.27) 
Indebtedness −0.062 (−1.03) −0.062 (−1.02) −0.079*** (−3.56) −0.079*** (−3.55) 
Constant −0.103 (−1.17) −0.120 (−1.10)  0.048 (0.94)    0.032 (0.51) 
Sector dummy variables   Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes 
Year dummy variables    Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes 
Wald chi test 82.94*** 91.62*** 41.95*** 42.96*** 
R-squared  14.76    14.74  17.95    18.32 
Observations 728 728 728 728 
Number of firms 104 104 104 104 
*P<0.1; **P<0.05;***P<0.01. Source: This study. The t statistic is presented in parentheses. All regressions have been estimated with the random effects model and robust errors. The 
dependent variables are ROE (calculated as the quotient between net income and equity) and ROA (calculated as the quotient between net income and assets). IOGP is the summation of 
the scores obtained in each of the corporate governance recommendations of the Country Code related to shareholders. %FAMILY indicates the percentage of family ownership. SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. Indebtedness is the ratio of total liabilities and total assets. The SECTOR and YEAR dummy variables identify the economic sector and the year of 
each observation. ROA: Return on assets, ROE: Return on equity, IOGP: Index of ownership governance practice 
 
important role in the economy. To this end, student’s t test and 
regression models estimated by RE were used considering the 
basis of the combination of agency theory and stewardship theory 
to understand and sustain the findings. 
 
First, it was found support for hypothesis 1 (H1) that stated 
that family and non-family businesses have different ownership 
governance practices. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Lagos et al. (2017) that identified differences in the 
implementation of FB and NFB governance practices, which 
over time tend to be increasingly homogeneous. In the present 
investigation, a punctual analysis of the corporate governance 
practices that shareholders use to make decisions and control their 
ownership is made, which is due to the divergence of interests 
in the economic and non-economic objectives of the controlling 
families, where aspects like prestige, legacy and prudence are 
dominant. 
 
On the other hand, Hypothesis 2 (H2) and 3 (H3) were not 
supported. Hypothesis 2 indicates to higher shareholders corporate 
governance practices, the higher the financial performance of 
Colombian businesses, and the Hypothesis 3 that proposed to 
higher family control, the higher the financial performance of 
Colombian businesses. 
 
As previously mentioned, some authors suggest ROA (Klapper 
and Love, 2004) as an indicator of overall performance or ROE 
as a performance indicator for theoretical and empirical studies of 
the owner’s perspective, because it eliminates the effect of interest 
expenses on profits (Brown and Caylor, 2009; Frankel and Lee, 
1998; Ohlson, 1995), but the results obtained in this study are not 
consistent with the literature that found a relationship between the 
financial performance and the practices of corporate governance 
and control. By emphasizing the corporate governance practices 
that depend on the shareholders and were part of the IOGP 
composed by seven measures of the country code (citation M1, 
Board selection and financial information M2, assembly agenda 
M4, shareholders attention M27, audit M29, conflict resolution 
M34 and tax auditor M38) the present study found that in the 
Colombian context there was no significant influence. 
 
These results are probably generated by the influence of the 
controlling families on corporate governance system. Young 
et al. (2008) identified agency conflicts between shareholders 
and managers, and between the controlling groups and minority 
shareholders. Leading shareholder or many times the same 
company founder, can lead to bias in the implementation of 
governance practices. It is common to see that companies meet 
the requirements in reports presented to the control entities, 
but in reality, all meet the mandates of the leading shareholder, 
which results in atypical behavior in the relationship of corporate 
governance practices with financial performance. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1. Conclusions 
Family businesses (FB) around the world are a large and important 
component of the economy (European Family Businesses, 2012). 
Their particular behavior has led many authors to study FB in order 
to identify what makes them different, as the corporate governance 
applied by the owner family (Chrisman et al., 2013) that can 
provide multiple benefits such as transparency, accountability 
and control (Brenes et al., 2011), also can influence their financial 
performance (Brown and Caylor, 2009; Klapper and Love, 2004). 
Despite the relevance of the topic, there is a gap in the literature 
of corporate governance in FB from the ownership dimension. 
 
This research raises the positive influence of some corporate 
governance practices at the level of ownership in financial 
performance. For example, promoting the accessibility and 
quality of the information, minimizes the information asymmetry 
between the company and the shareholders (Prommin et al., 2014), 
and could positively impacts the shareholder climate and can 
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facilitate an adequate communication and decision making in the 
assembly, therefore a positive impact on performance. According 
to Westhead and Howorth (2006), family influence on ownership, 
which is consistent with the stewardship theory in conjunction with 
agency theory, supports a higher performance derived from greater 
control of the major shareholders and the reduction of conflicts of 
interest between the owners and the management derived to the 
transmission of family characteristics in the corporate culture. 
 
This longitudinal study uses a quantitative approach with an 
explanatory scope that pretends to answer the following research 
question: Do shareholders corporate governance practices and 
family control influence financial performance on businesses? 
104 public companies, of which 49 were FB, were analyzed, 
using data from National registry of securities and issuers, which 
also responded to the Country Code ‘survey of Colombia in the 
period 2008 to 2014. Data was processed with student’s t test and 
regression models estimated by RE. 
 
With results was accepted the Hypothesis 1 (H1) that indicates family 
and non-family businesses have different ownership governance 
practices. According with Lagos et al. (2017) there are differences 
in corporate governance practices implemented by the FB and the 
NFB, because the FB are more conservative in making long-term 
changes that may affect their power and control dynamics, which are 
usually concentrated in the founder or shareholder leader, or in a few 
people of the controlling family. This research shows that there is 
a significant difference between the corporate governance practices 
implemented at the ownership level between the FB and NFB. 
 
The acceptance of hypotheses 1 derives from this study large 
contributions to the areas of corporate governance and family 
business. On the one hand, the theoretical contribution of opening 
a new scenario for the study of ownership governance, which in the 
long term can contribute to the competitiveness and longevity of 
companies; on the other hand, there is a practical contribution by 
giving rise to the design of a model of practices for shareholders, 
where they develop a more active role, taking into account that 
at the level of ownership the most important capital and strategy 
decisions are made when are exceeded the decision limits of the 
Board of Directors; Finally, a contribution in public policy is 
created by supporting the need to highlight corporate governance 
practices at the owners level, with corporate governance models 
that differentiate FB and NFB. 
 
With the statistical analysis Hypothesis 2 and 3 were rejected, were 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) pointed out that to higher shareholders corporate 
governance practices, the higher the financial performance of 
Colombian businesses, and the Hypothesis 3 (H3) that states to 
higher family control, the higher the financial performance of 
Colombian businesses. In both cases, the predominant role of 
an influential person in the organization, as a leading founder or 
shareholder, or an influential family group, is likely to blur the 
effect of family culture and good corporate governance practices, 
and therefore, its influence on financial performance. 
 
Practices in developed countries can be successful, as the 
appropriate treatment of minority shareholders, access to 
information, tools, control and conflict resolution in the Colombian 
context is not statistically evident, reason why should deepen if the 
role of the owners is adequate, if they exercise their functions or 
if they are being delegated to another instance of the organization. 
Also, it is considered necessary to analyze the phenomenon with 
qualitative research due to the lack of knowledge and the gap open 
with this study in the field of ownership of family businesses. 
 
7.2. Implications 
This study highlights the importance of the role of owners in the 
businesses, which is reflected in the identification of the significant 
differences in the implementation of corporate governance 
practices at the ownership level between FB and NFB, which 
was supported by accepting hypothesis 1; which becomes the 
main practical implication of the study, given that it can allow 
us to understand that the FB have a different approach to the 
implementation of governance practices of the ownership of 
their companies and therefore require a different proposal, which 
gives them the benefits they seek, which probably go beyond 
the economic aspects, and they care more about non-economic 
objectives, such as unity, family harmony and business legacy 
(Gómez et al., 2016). 
 
On the other hand, the relationship between shareholder 
governance practices and family control with the financial 
performance of the companies, had no support and hypotheses 2 
and 3 were rejected. In line with findings of Crisostomo and de 
Freitas Brandão (2019) family control has a negative effect on 
the quality of corporate governance practices which is focused to 
favor individualistic interests. 
 
The main academic implication is the separation of the concept 
of corporate governance under a shareholder-focused analysis, 
since all previous studies mix the practices of shareholders, Board 
members, Managers and control roles and blur the effect of the 
responsibilities of each of them in the company. It is important to 
note that this study has delimitations and limitations as described 
below. 
 
This research analyzes Shareholders’ corporate governance 
practices included in the country code of Colombia for companies 
listed in the NRVI. They are the largest economic organizations in 
the country, and it is supposed that they have the best governance 
practices to ensure transparency and investor’s confidence. This 
study is delimited to: (a) companies with high levels of formality 
(processes, hierarchy, among others) rather than micro and SME; 
(b) companies that belong to the Colombian capital market; and 
(c) companies with a similar cultural background. 
 
This study was designed based on two assumptions, first that the 
theories of agency and stewardship reflect the phenomenon to be 
studied in Colombia, furthermore it is assumed that Colombian 
family businesses are managed in a similar way as in developed 
countries, where other studies have been developed. One limitation 
of the study is that the responses of the companies in the country 
code survey could be not totally sincere, due to the need to report 
appropriate information to the control entity that applied the survey 
or because they seek to promote a message of confidence to the 
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investor market, the second limitation is the potential problem of 
endogeneity that is usual in corporate governance analysis (Akbar 
et al., 2016), the third limitation is that the Country Code Survey 
asks companies about their behavior and requests descriptions of 
the past, so it is likely that the data has a potential common method 
bias (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). 
 
7.3. Recommendations 
Considering that it is relevant to study family businesses due 
to its predominance in economies (Holderness, 2009) and its 
contribution to the generation of employment and of wealth of 
countries (Shanker and Astrachan, 1996), it is important to continue 
exploring the relation between ownership and indicators of financial 
performance that expresses the ability of the company to generate 
profits which can be one of the main motivators for shareholders 
to implement best governance practices. In future research it is 
suggested to apply single analysis of financial indicators because 
each indicator may reflect different perspectives of the different 
stakeholders of the organization and the heterogeneous profiles of 
shareholders which in family businesses may be interested in 
economic objectives, socio-emotional goals (Berrone et al., 2010) 
or a mixture of both. It can also be considered for future studies 
to make a segmentation of the database with companies that have 
control of the participation of single or up to three family groups 
(Gómez-Betancourt et al., 2012), because it is likely that in 
countries like Colombia shows similar behaviors but there is not 
enough evidence to treat them differently. Another aspect to study 
is the influence of the concentration of ownership’ power on one 
or few shareholders of the same family, and analyzing it from this 
perspective would lead to designing models of corporate 
governance more effective in the distribution of power and control. 
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Appendix A: Literature Map of Ownership Governance Practices and Performance of Family Business 
 
 
 
Ownership in Family 
Business (Betancourt et 
al., 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
Long term 
Rent generation potential (Habbershon 
et al., 2003) 
 
 
Firm performance Conflict, 
satisfaction, commitment, harmony;   
familial assets and lower agency costs 
(Beehr et al., 1997; Dyer, 
2006) 
 
Family influence 
F-PEC measure power, 
experience and culture 
(Astrachan et al., 2002) 
 
 
Multi-family business 
Enterprises with majority 
family ownership structures 
(Gómez et al. 2012) 
Single family  business 
A family shareholder group 
has the highest proportion 
of voting rights (Villalonga 
& Amit, 2006) 
 
Family council 
Structures and procedures help the family to 
organize and manage the family-business 
relationship (Berent-Braun & Uhlaner, 2012) 
 
 
Board of Directors Decision-making 
body that directs to achieve the 
objectives, and design the strategy 
(Gersick & Feliu, 2014) 
 
 
Entrepreneurial orientation 
Risk taking, and performance (Naldi, et 
al. 2007) 
 
 
 
Efficiency 
Capital structure (McConaughy et al., 
2001) 
 
 
 
Financial performance Tobins´Q; ROE; 
ROA; ROCE; Sales growth; Size, 
margins; debt (Dyer 2006) 
 
 
Performance Measurement of 
results. Can be qualitative based on 
perceptions or quantitative 
 
 
Corporate governance Group of 
mechanisms with which stakeholders exert 
control over information and executive 
management (John & Senbet, 
1998) 
 
Top managers 
Responsible for day-to-day management 
and strategy implementation (Gómez et al., 
2016) 
 
 
Shareholder Assembly Exercise 
control and decision making to influence 
the macro strategy of the company 
(Gómez et al., 2016) 
 
 
Owners  Council 
Helps owners with accounting, legal, 
diversification, synergies, risks and return 
parameters (Gómez et al., 2016) 
 
Source: This study 
 
Appendix B: Theoretical framework 
 
Factorss Concept 
Dimension of corporate governance of 
ownership 
 
 
 
Dimension of corporate governance of 
the Board 
 
 
 
Dimension of corporate governance of 
management 
 
Dimension of corporate governance 
of control 
It is the highest level of decision making in a company. There, the shareholders receive information 
and exercise actions on statutes, investments, divestitures, dividends, debt, board of directors, audit, 
fees, corporate governance guidelines in general terms and other mechanisms to control, understand 
and evaluate their assets. The governing bodies of this dimension are the General Assembly of 
Shareholders, Owners’ Council and Committees of the assembly. 
It is elected by the shareholders’ meeting and is responsible for overseeing the interests of shareholders, 
designing the corporate strategy and guiding senior management to ensure the fulfillment of short- 
and long-term objectives. The profile of its members is high and its decisions are characterized by 
independence. The Board may rely on committees for strategy, nomination, remuneration, evaluation, 
among others. 
Both the General Manager and the executives who make up the top management of the company, are 
responsible for the implementation of the strategy, as well as the daily administration of resources and 
law’ compliance. 
At this level, the governing bodies are the internal and external auditors and their Committees. They are 
in charge of supervision, control, risk analysis, verification of transparency and fluidity of information, 
the independence of corporate governance actors and the timely implementation of corrective actions. 
 
Adapted from “Gobierno Corporativo. Prácticas sugeridas e implementadas por empresas familiares y no familiares colombianas” by Gómez-Betancourt, G., Zapata-Cuervo, N., and 
Betancourt-Ramírez, J. B., 2016, Entramado, 12(2), pp. 12-29 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter presents the conclusions of the research based on the statistical results 
of the relationship of corporate governance and family control with financial performance. 
Conclusions 
Family businesses (FB) around the world are a large and important component of 
the economy (European Family Businesses, 2012). Their particular behavior has led many 
authors to study FB in order to identify what makes them different, as the corporate 
governance applied by the owner family (Chrisman, Sharma, Steier, & Chua, 2013) that 
can provide multiple benefits such as transparency, accountability and control (Brenes et 
al., 2011), also can influence their financial performance (Brown & Caylor, 2009; Klapper 
& Love, 2004). Despite the relevance of the topic, there is a gap in the literature of 
corporate governance in FB from the ownership dimension. 
This research raises the positive influence of some corporate governance practices 
at the level of ownership in financial performance. For example, promoting the 
accessibility and quality of the information, minimizes the information asymmetry between 
the company and the shareholders (Prommin, Jumreornvong, & Jiraporn, 2014), and could 
positively impacts the shareholder climate and can facilitate an adequate communication 
and decision making in the assembly, therefore a positive impact on performance. 
According to Westhead and Howorth (2006), family influence on ownership, which is 
consistent with the stewardship theory in conjunction with agency theory, supports a 
higher performance derived from greater control of the major shareholders and the 
reduction of conflicts of interest between the owners and the management derived to the 
transmission of family characteristics in the corporate culture.  
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This longitudinal study uses a quantitative approach with an explanatory scope that 
pretends to answer the following research question: Do shareholders corporate governance 
practices and family control influence financial performance on businesses? 104 public 
companies, of which 49 were FB, were analyzed, using data from National registry of 
securities and issuers, which also responded to the Country Code 'survey of Colombia in 
the period 2008 to 2014. Data was processed with student's t test and regression models 
estimated by random effects. 
With results was accepted the Hypothesis 1 (H1) that indicates family and non-
family businesses have different ownership governance practices. According with Lagos, 
Betancourt and Gomez (2017) there are differences in corporate governance practices 
implemented by the FB and the NFB, because the FB are more conservative in making 
long-term changes that may affect their power and control dynamics, which are usually 
concentrated in the founder or shareholder leader, or in a few people of the controlling 
family. This research shows that there is a significant difference between the corporate 
governance practices implemented at the ownership level between the FB and NFB. 
The acceptance of hypotheses 1 derives from this study large contributions to the 
areas of corporate governance and family business. On the one hand, the theoretical 
contribution of opening a new scenario for the study of ownership governance, which in 
the long term can contribute to the competitiveness and longevity of companies; on the 
other hand, there is a practical contribution by giving rise to the design of a model of 
practices for shareholders, where they develop a more active role, taking into account that 
at the level of ownership the most important capital and strategy decisions are made when 
are exceeded the decision limits of the Board of Directors; Finally, a contribution in public 
policy is created by supporting the need to highlight corporate governance practices at the 
owners level, with corporate governance models that differentiate FB and NFB. 
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With the statistical analysis Hypothesis 2 and 3 were rejected, were Hypothesis 2 
(H2) pointed out that to higher shareholders corporate governance practices, the higher the 
financial performance of Colombian businesses, and the Hypothesis 3 (H3) that states to 
higher family control, the higher the financial performance of Colombian businesses. In 
both cases, the predominant role of an influential person in the organization, as a leading 
founder or shareholder, or an influential family group, is likely to blur the effect of family 
culture and good corporate governance practices, and therefore, its influence on financial 
performance. 
Practices in developed countries can be successful, as the appropriate treatment of 
minority shareholders, access to information, tools, control and conflict resolution in the 
Colombian context is not statistically evident, reason why should deepen if the role of the 
owners is adequate, if they exercise their functions or if they are being delegated to another 
instance of the organization. Also, it is considered necessary to analyze the phenomenon 
with qualitative research due to the lack of knowledge and the gap open with this study in 
the field of ownership of family businesses. 
Implications 
This study highlights the importance of the role of owners in the businesses, which 
is reflected in the identification of the significant differences in the implementation of 
corporate governance practices at the ownership level between FB and NFB, which was 
supported by accepting hypothesis 1; which becomes the main practical implication of the 
study, given that it can allow us to understand that the FB have a different approach to the 
implementation of governance practices of the ownership of their companies and therefore 
require a different proposal, which gives them the benefits they seek, which probably go 
beyond the economic aspects, and they care more about non-economic objectives, such as 
unity, family harmony and business legacy (Gómez et al., 2016). 
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On the other hand, the relationship between shareholder governance practices and 
family control with the financial performance of the companies, had no support and 
hypotheses 2 and 3 were rejected. In line with findings of Crisostomo and de Freitas 
Brandão (2019) family control has a negative effect on the quality of corporate governance 
practices which is focused to favor individualistic interests.  
The main academic implication is the separation of the concept of corporate 
governance under a shareholder-focused analysis, since all previous studies mix the 
practices of shareholders, Board members, Managers and control roles and blur the effect 
of the responsibilities of each of them in the company. It is important to note that this study 
has delimitations and limitations as described below. 
This research analyzes Shareholders´ corporate governance practices included in 
the country code of Colombia for companies listed in the NRVI. They are the largest 
economic organizations in the country, and it is supposed that they have the best 
governance practices to ensure transparency and investor’s confidence. This study is 
delimited to: (a) companies with high levels of formality (processes, hierarchy, among 
others) rather than micro and SME; (b) companies that belong to the Colombian capital 
market; and (c) companies with a similar cultural background. 
This study was designed based on two assumptions, first that the theories of agency 
and stewardship reflect the phenomenon to be studied in Colombia, furthermore it is 
assumed that Colombian family businesses are managed in a similar way as in developed 
countries, where other studies have been developed. One limitation of the study is that the 
responses of the companies in the country code survey could be not totally sincere, due to 
the need to report appropriate information to the control entity that applied the survey or 
because they seek to promote a message of confidence to the investor market, the second 
limitation is the potential problem of endogeneity that is usual in corporate governance 
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analysis (Akbar, Poletti-Hughes, El-Faitouri, & Shah, 2016), the third limitation is that the 
Country Code Survey asks companies about their behavior and requests descriptions of the 
past, so it is likely that the data has a potential common method bias (Podsakoff & Organ, 
1986). 
Recommendations 
Considering that it is relevant to study family businesses due to its predominance in 
economies(Holderness, 2009) and its contribution to the generation of employment and of 
wealth of countries (Shanker & Astrachan, 1996), it is important to continue exploring the 
relation between ownership and indicators of financial performance that expresses the 
ability of the company to generate profits which can be one of the main motivators for 
shareholders to implement best governance practices.. In future research it is suggested to 
apply single analysis of financial indicators because each indicator may reflect different 
perspectives of the different stakeholders of the organization and the heterogeneous 
profiles of shareholders which in family businesses may be interested in economic 
objectives, socio-emotional goals (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010) 
or a mixture of both. It can also be considered for future studies to make a segmentation of 
the database with companies that have control of the participation of single or up to three 
family groups (Gómez-Betancourt et al., 2012), because it is likely that in countries like 
Colombia shows similar behaviors but there is not enough evidence to treat them 
differently. Another aspect to study is the influence of the concentration of ownership´ 
power on one or few shareholders of the same family, and analyzing it from this 
perspective would lead to designing models of corporate governance more effective in the 
distribution of power and control.  
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Appendix A: Theoretical Framework 
Table B4. 
Theoretical Framework 
Factors Concept 
Dimension of 
corporate 
governance of 
ownership 
 
 
 
 
 
Dimension of 
corporate 
governance of the 
Board 
 
 
 
 
Dimension of 
corporate 
governance of 
management 
 
Dimension of 
corporate 
governance of 
control 
It is the highest level of decision making in a company. There, the 
shareholders receive information and exercise actions on statutes, 
investments, divestitures, dividends, debt, board of directors, audit, 
fees, corporate governance guidelines in general terms and other 
mechanisms to control, understand and evaluate their assets. The 
governing bodies of this dimension are the General Assembly of 
Shareholders, Owners´ Council and Committees of the assembly. 
 
It is elected by the shareholders' meeting and is responsible for 
overseeing the interests of shareholders, designing the corporate 
strategy and guiding senior management to ensure the fulfillment of 
short and long term objectives. The profile of its members is high 
and its decisions are characterized by independence. The Board may 
rely on committees for strategy, nomination, remuneration, 
evaluation, among others. 
 
Both the General Manager and the executives who make up the top 
management of the company, are responsible for the implementation 
of the strategy, as well as the daily administration of resources and 
law´ compliance. 
 
At this level, the governing bodies are the internal and external 
auditors and their Committees. They are in charge of supervision, 
control, risk analysis, verification of transparency and fluidity of 
information, the independence of corporate governance actors and 
the timely implementation of corrective actions. 
Adapted from “Gobierno Corporativo. Prácticas sugeridas e implementadas por empresas 
familiares y no familiares colombianas” by Gómez-Betancourt, G., Zapata-Cuervo, N., and 
Betancourt-Ramírez, J. B., 2016, Entramado, 12(2), pp. 12-29. 
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Appendix B: Informed Consent Format for Experts 
 
Bogotá, Junio de 2017 
Dr.______. 
Ciudad 
 
Asunto: Elección de prácticas de gobierno corporativo de la propiedad, para tesis doctoral 
 
Estimado Dr. ________, reciba un cordial saludo. 
Por medio de la presente me permito expresarle mi saludo y agradecimiento por su 
participación en la entrevista que pretende seleccionar las prácticas de gobierno 
corporativo del Código País, que están directamente influenciadas por el nivel de la 
propiedad empresarial, es decir, aquellas inherentes a los accionistas. 
Lo anterior se hace con el fin de determinar la existencia de una influencia directa 
de las prácticas de gobierno de la propiedad en el desempeño de las empresas que cotizan 
en la bolsa de valores. 
Los resultados de las entrevistas aplicadas a expertos en el área de gobierno 
corporativo de la empresa familiar, harán parte de la investigación que realizo para optar el 
grado de Doctor in Strategic Business Administration – DBA otorgado por CENTRUM 
Graduate Business Shool de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú en doble titulación 
con Maastricht School of Management, con la tesis titulada «Ownership Governance 
Practices and their Influence on Family Businesses Financial Performance». 
El tiempo de duración aproximada de la entrevista es de 30 minutos. Los datos 
generales de la entrevista serán publicados, junto con su nombre. Al contestar la entrevista, 
manifestará su consentimiento de participar en la investigación. 
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Estaré atento a su respuesta para coordinar fecha y hora para realizar la entrevista 
vía presencial o virtual. Si tiene alguna inquietud con gusto la atenderé vía telefónica o por 
e-mail, datos que aparecen junto a mi firma de correo electrónico. 
De antemano agradezco su colaboración.  
Cordialmente, 
 
Jose Betancourt 
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Appendix C: Interview Format 
Table D5.  
Format of Interview with Experts 
Expert interview notes 
Date                       Place                       
Start Time   End time   
Name   
Credentials   
Institutional affiliation   
Phone   Skype   
e-mail   
Main subjects discussed 
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Appendix D: Expert interview notes 
Table E6.  
Expert interview notes 
Name Jorge Moreno Diogenes Lagos Gonzalo Gómez 
Date 14/06/2017 15/06/2017 16/06/2017 
Place Skype Skype Skype 
Start Time 2:00 p.m. 9:00 a.m. 7:00 a.m. 
End time 2:45 p.m. 9:50 a.m. 7:40 a.m. 
Credentials Vice Chancellor for 
Extension 
Researcher CEO 
Institutional 
affiliation 
Corporación 
Universidad de la Costa, 
CUC (Colombia) 
Inalde Business 
School, Universidad de 
La Sabana 
L&M Consulting 
Group 
Phone  +57 310 6303925  +57 314 3964355  +57 315 3195728 
Skype jimgcuc Dlagosc1 Gonzalogobe 
e-mail jmoreno@cuc.edu.co 
diogenes.lagos@inalde
.edu.co 
gonzalo.gomez@lym
group.com 
Main subjects 
discussed 
Country Code measures: 
M1,M2,M4,M27, 
M29,M34,M38 
Country Code 
measures: 
M1,M2,M4,M27, 
M29,M34,M38 
Country Code 
measures: 
M1,M2,M4,M27, 
M29,M34,M38 
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Appendix E: Style Review Statement 
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Appendix F: Presentation of the defended RP 
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Appendix G: Presentation of the defended Thesis 
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